Richard

{
    "slug": "dynamic-taxonomy-menu-items",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/Plugin/Plugin.php",
        "line": 289,
        "snippet": "$puc = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker( $this->github, $this->paths->file, $this->plugin );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}