Events

{
    "slug": "fireems-stats",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fireems-stats.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
    "url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
    "slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}

{
    "slug": "leyka",
    "new_contributors": [
        "vaultdweller"
    ],
    "active_installs": 2000
}

{
    "slug": "widget-countdown",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 10000,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped low\u2192medium: author wpdevart has 5 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}