Events

445 events resolved (filtered). · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern Digital Publishing Tools for WordPress (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugdigital-publishing
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "digital-publishing",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern BotBanish by Randem Systems (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugbotbanish-firewall-client
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version9.0.05
Hit count1
First hit
File
bot/Subs/BotBanish_Subs_DumpDatabase.php
Line
428
Snippet
$conn = new mysqli($dbInfo['server'], $dbInfo['username'], $dbInfo['password'], $dbInfo['database']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "botbanish-firewall-client",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "9.0.05",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bot/Subs/BotBanish_Subs_DumpDatabase.php",
        "line": 428,
        "snippet": "$conn = new mysqli($dbInfo['server'], $dbInfo['username'], $dbInfo['password'], $dbInfo['database']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Mensagia for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwoo-mensagia
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
classes/MensagiaSDK.php
Line
212
Snippet
'callback_url' => 'http://195.10.21.174/pass/mensagia_test_callback.php'
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-mensagia",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/MensagiaSDK.php",
        "line": 212,
        "snippet": "'callback_url'  => 'http://195.10.21.174/pass/mensagia_test_callback.php'"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern MarketPowerWP (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmarketpowerwp
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.9
Hit count1
First hit
File
leplugin.php
Line
18
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://s3.amazonaws.com/multisoft-wordpress/plugins/marketpowerwp/release.json
Url hosts3.amazonaws.com
Slug argmarketpowerwp
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "marketpowerwp",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.9",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "leplugin.php",
        "line": 18,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/multisoft-wordpress/plugins/marketpowerwp/release.json",
    "url_host": "s3.amazonaws.com",
    "slug_arg": "marketpowerwp"
}
Critical code_pattern Paquete.MX (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpaquete-mx
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version4.2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
admin/admin_actions.php
Line
230
Snippet
$baseDownloadLink = isset($config['paquetemx_checkbox_production']) ? 'http://54.201.237.120?trackingNumber=' : 'http://54.201.237.120/dev.php?trackingNumber=';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "paquete-mx",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "admin/admin_actions.php",
        "line": 230,
        "snippet": "$baseDownloadLink = isset($config['paquetemx_checkbox_production']) ? 'http://54.201.237.120?trackingNumber=' : 'http://54.201.237.120/dev.php?trackingNumber=';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern MoceanAPI SendSMS (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmoceanapi-sendsms
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.11
Hit count3
First hit
File
lib/MoceanSMS.php
Line
23
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moceanapi-sendsms",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.11",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/MoceanSMS.php",
        "line": 23,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Online Payments for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugonline-payments-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count12
First hit
File
class-wenqy-online-wc-payment-gateway.php
Line
123
Snippet
'default' => 'https://101.231.204.80:5000',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "online-payments-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 12,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class-wenqy-online-wc-payment-gateway.php",
        "line": 123,
        "snippet": "'default' => 'https://101.231.204.80:5000',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Groovy Menu Plugin (Free) (4k+ installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Sluggroovy-menu-free
Patterndecode_write_dropper
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/modules/core/inc/GroovyMenuSettings.php
Line
1,177
Snippet
$tmpFile = file_put_contents( $filename, base64_decode( $value['data'] ) );
Explanationa runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path — the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "groovy-menu-free",
    "pattern": "decode_write_dropper",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/modules/core/inc/GroovyMenuSettings.php",
        "line": 1177,
        "snippet": "$tmpFile    = file_put_contents( $filename, base64_decode( $value['data'] ) );"
    },
    "explanation": "a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path \u2014 the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote."
}
Critical code_pattern Content Guard Pro – Database Malware Scanner & SEO Spam Detector (40 installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Slugcontent-guard-pro
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/signatures.pack
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via base64+gzuncompress)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "content-guard-pro",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/signatures.pack",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via base64+gzuncompress)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern Unofficial Yektanet (30 installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Slugunofficial-yektanet
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
unofficialYektanet.php
Line
37
Snippet
define('YEKTANET_PRODUCT_UPDATE_API_URL', 'http://87.247.185.150/products');
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "unofficial-yektanet",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "unofficialYektanet.php",
        "line": 37,
        "snippet": "define('YEKTANET_PRODUCT_UPDATE_API_URL', 'http://87.247.185.150/products');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern POP – e-invoicing for WooCommerce: SdI, PEPPOL, KSeF (ex-WooPop) (100 installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Slugwoopop-electronic-invoice-free
Patterndecode_write_dropper
Kindbuiltin
Version6.9.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
addon/to/aruba/src/Functions/Api.php
Line
797
Snippet
$pdfFile = base64_decode($responseData->pdfFile);
Explanationa runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path — the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woopop-electronic-invoice-free",
    "pattern": "decode_write_dropper",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.9.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "addon/to/aruba/src/Functions/Api.php",
        "line": 797,
        "snippet": "$pdfFile = base64_decode($responseData->pdfFile);"
    },
    "explanation": "a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path \u2014 the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote."
}
Critical code_pattern BitFire Security – Firewall, Malware Scanner, Bot Blocker, Login Protection (300 installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Slugbitfire
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.9
Hit count3
First hit
File
src/util.php
Line
3,429
Snippet
$url = 'https://1.1.1.1/dns-query?name=' . urlencode($query) . '&type=PTR';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bitfire",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.9",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/util.php",
        "line": 3429,
        "snippet": "$url      = 'https://1.1.1.1/dns-query?name=' . urlencode($query) . '&type=PTR';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Trakoo – Orders Tracking for WooCommerce (10k+ installs) Resolved 4mo ago
Slugwoo-orders-tracking
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.3.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-vi-woo-orders-tracking-trackingmore.php
Line
331
Snippet
return vi_wot_json_decode( '[{"courier_name":"DHL Express","courier_code":"dhl","courier_type":"express","courier_phone":null,"country_code":"DE","courier_url":"http://www.dhl.com/en/express/tracki
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-orders-tracking",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.3.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-vi-woo-orders-tracking-trackingmore.php",
        "line": 331,
        "snippet": "return vi_wot_json_decode( '[{\"courier_name\":\"DHL Express\",\"courier_code\":\"dhl\",\"courier_type\":\"express\",\"courier_phone\":null,\"country_code\":\"DE\",\"courier_url\":\"http://www.dhl.com/en/express/tracki"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low code_pattern Opal Woo Custom Product Variation (300 installs) Benign 4mo ago
Slugopal-woo-custom-product-variation
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.3.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php
Line
65
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttp://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json
Url hostsource.wpopal.com
Slug argopal-woo-custom-product-variation
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.3.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "http://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json",
    "url_host": "source.wpopal.com",
    "slug_arg": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation"
}
Critical code_pattern RS Remote Site Manager (100 installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Slugrootscope-remote-site-manager
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version2.7.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-data-collector.php
Line
129
Snippet
'eth_call',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "rootscope-remote-site-manager",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "2.7.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-data-collector.php",
        "line": 129,
        "snippet": "'eth_call',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WPHEKA Server Information and phpinfo (10 installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Slugwpheka-web-server-information
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.7
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-wpheka-info-admin-webserver.php
Line
109
Snippet
L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php → L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wpheka-web-server-information",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.7",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wpheka-info-admin-webserver.php",
        "line": 109,
        "snippet": "L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php  \u2192  L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Mylerz (60 installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Slugmylerz
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.5
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/mylerz-ajax.php
Line
15
Snippet
global $mylerz_integration_api; //= 'http://41.33.122.61:58639';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mylerz",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.5",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/mylerz-ajax.php",
        "line": 15,
        "snippet": "global $mylerz_integration_api; //= 'http://41.33.122.61:58639';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern SpeedyGo (100 installs) Suspicious 5mo ago
Slugspeedy-go
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/api-key-api.php
Line
298
Snippet
L290: $resbody = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response); → L298: while (is_string($opts) && @unserialize($opts, ['allowed_classes' => false]) !== false)
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "speedy-go",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/api-key-api.php",
        "line": 298,
        "snippet": "L290: $resbody = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L298: while (is_string($opts) && @unserialize($opts, ['allowed_classes' => false]) !== false)"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Unlock Protocol (40 installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Slugunlock-protocol
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version4.0.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/classes/class-unlock.php
Line
104
Snippet
'method' => 'eth_call',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "unlock-protocol",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "4.0.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/classes/class-unlock.php",
        "line": 104,
        "snippet": "'method'  => 'eth_call',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern AI ChatBot for WooCommerce – WoowBot (900 installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Slugwoowbot-woocommerce-chatbot
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.7.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/ai_integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php
Line
189
Snippet
L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woowbot-woocommerce-chatbot",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.7.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/ai_integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 189,
        "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Slugbit-form
PatterngetWPUsers
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.0.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php
Line
98
Snippet
add_action('wp_ajax_bitforms_get_wp_users', [$this, 'getWPUsers']);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bit-form",
    "pattern": "getWPUsers",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.0.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Admin/AdminAjax.php",
        "line": 98,
        "snippet": "add_action('wp_ajax_bitforms_get_wp_users',   [$this, 'getWPUsers']);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Geeky Bot – AI Chatbot & Sales Assistant for WooCommerce (6k+ installs) Resolved 5mo ago
Sluggeeky-bot
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
modules/slots/model.php
Line
516
Snippet
$url = "http://194.163.183.46:8008/";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "geeky-bot",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "modules/slots/model.php",
        "line": 516,
        "snippet": "$url = \"http://194.163.183.46:8008/\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Social Share Icons & Social Share Buttons (10k+ installs) Suspicious 5mo ago
Slugultimate-social-media-plus
Patternwp_ajax_worker_plugin
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
libs/controllers/sfsi_buttons_controller.php
Line
1,691
Snippet
add_action('wp_ajax_worker_plugin','sfsi_plus_worker_plugin');
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ultimate-social-media-plus",
    "pattern": "wp_ajax_worker_plugin",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libs/controllers/sfsi_buttons_controller.php",
        "line": 1691,
        "snippet": "add_action('wp_ajax_worker_plugin','sfsi_plus_worker_plugin');"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Social Share Icons & Social Share Buttons (10k+ installs) Suspicious 5mo ago
Slugultimate-social-media-plus
Patternshopify-js-bucket.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com
Kindioc:domain
Version3.7.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
libs/controllers/sfsi_buttons_controller.php
Line
1,712
Snippet
$installed = $upgrader->install('https://shopify-js-bucket.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/sfsi_worker_premium_installer-0.0.1.zip');
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ultimate-social-media-plus",
    "pattern": "shopify-js-bucket.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "3.7.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libs/controllers/sfsi_buttons_controller.php",
        "line": 1712,
        "snippet": "$installed = $upgrader->install('https://shopify-js-bucket.s3.ap-south-1.amazonaws.com/sfsi_worker_premium_installer-0.0.1.zip');"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Epeken for Anteraja (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluganteraja
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
epeken-anteraja.php
Line
86
Snippet
$server = 'http://103.252.101.131';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "anteraja",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "epeken-anteraja.php",
        "line": 86,
        "snippet": "$server = 'http://103.252.101.131';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Speedaf Express for woocommerce (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugspeedaf-express-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.3
Hit count2
First hit
File
sdk/Configuration.php
Line
8
Snippet
'base_path' => API_DEBUG ? 'http://8.214.27.92:8480/' : 'https://apis.speedaf.com/', // kinldy replace this with the LIVE PATH like 'api.speedaf.com'
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "speedaf-express-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.3",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "sdk/Configuration.php",
        "line": 8,
        "snippet": "'base_path' => API_DEBUG ? 'http://8.214.27.92:8480/' : 'https://apis.speedaf.com/', // kinldy replace this with the LIVE PATH like 'api.speedaf.com'"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern DPD in Russia – Shipping for WooCommerce (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-dpd
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/dpd-sdk/src/lib/API/Service/TrackingOrder.php
Line
13
Snippet
const TEST_API_URL = 'http://91.209.80.50:9090/ordertracking ';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-dpd",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/dpd-sdk/src/lib/API/Service/TrackingOrder.php",
        "line": 13,
        "snippet": "const TEST_API_URL = 'http://91.209.80.50:9090/ordertracking ';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Payment gateway for WooCommerce – Woo Alipay (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-alipay
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php
Line
6
Snippet
return new mysqli($connConf["host"], $connConf["username"], $connConf["password"], $connConf["dbname"], $connConf["port"]);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-alipay",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php",
        "line": 6,
        "snippet": "return new mysqli($connConf[\"host\"], $connConf[\"username\"], $connConf[\"password\"], $connConf[\"dbname\"], $connConf[\"port\"]);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Joomla 1.5 Importer (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugjoomla-15-importer
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
joomla-15-importer.php
Line
177
Snippet
$db = new mysqli( $db_info[ 'hostname' ], $db_info[ 'username' ], $db_info[ 'password' ], $db_info[ 'database' ], $db_info[ 'port' ] );
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "joomla-15-importer",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "joomla-15-importer.php",
        "line": 177,
        "snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $db_info[ 'hostname' ], $db_info[ 'username' ], $db_info[ 'password' ], $db_info[ 'database' ], $db_info[ 'port' ] );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern MoceanAPI Order SMS Notification for WooCommerce (50 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmoceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.12
Hit count3
First hit
File
lib/MoceanSMS.php
Line
24
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.12",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/MoceanSMS.php",
        "line": 24,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern KnowledgeBase with AI ChatBot HelpDesk – KBx (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugknowledgebase-helpdesk
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.7.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php
Line
189
Snippet
L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "knowledgebase-helpdesk",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.7.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 189,
        "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern OTP Authenticator (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugotp-authenticator
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php
Line
36
Snippet
private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php",
        "line": 36,
        "snippet": "private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Gravity Forms Campaign Fields Add-On (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggf-campaign-fields
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.1
Hit count38
First hit
File
lib/whichbrowser/parser/data/profiles.php
Line
600
Snippet
'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML' => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "gf-campaign-fields",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.1",
    "hit_count": 38,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/whichbrowser/parser/data/profiles.php",
        "line": 600,
        "snippet": "'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML'                                              => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Is there a problem (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugis-there-a-problem
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
is-there-a-problem.php
Line
413
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapegithub_self_distro
Urlhttps://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem
Url hostgithub.com
Slug argis_there_a_problem
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "is-there-a-problem",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "is-there-a-problem.php",
        "line": 413,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "github_self_distro",
    "url": "https://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem",
    "url_host": "github.com",
    "slug_arg": "is_there_a_problem"
}
Critical code_pattern STN – Save To Nextcloud (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstn-save-to-nextcloud
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/CreateBDD.php
Line
30
Snippet
$mysqli = new mysqli($thisBDD['DB_HOST'], $thisBDD['DB_USER'], $thisBDD['DB_PASSWORD'], $thisBDD['DB_NAME']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stn-save-to-nextcloud",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/CreateBDD.php",
        "line": 30,
        "snippet": "$mysqli = new mysqli($thisBDD['DB_HOST'], $thisBDD['DB_USER'], $thisBDD['DB_PASSWORD'], $thisBDD['DB_NAME']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – Events / Locations Slider (90 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstonehenge-em-slider
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.8.7
Hit count1
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stonehenge-em-slider",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.8.7",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern GoDAM – Video Hosting for LMS & Online Courses (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggodam
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.0
Hit count4
First hit
File
inc/classes/rest-api/class-analytics.php
Line
166
Snippet
$analytics_endpoint = RTGODAM_ANALYTICS_BASE . '/processed-analytics/fetch/';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "godam",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.0",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/classes/rest-api/class-analytics.php",
        "line": 166,
        "snippet": "$analytics_endpoint = RTGODAM_ANALYTICS_BASE . '/processed-analytics/fetch/';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern AI Workflow Automation (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugai-workflow-automation-lite
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.4.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-wp-ai-workflows-analytics-collector.php
Line
5
Snippet
private $analytics_endpoint = 'https://wpaiworkflows.com/wp-json/wp-ai-workflows-analytics/v1/collect';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ai-workflow-automation-lite",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.4.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wp-ai-workflows-analytics-collector.php",
        "line": 5,
        "snippet": "private $analytics_endpoint = 'https://wpaiworkflows.com/wp-json/wp-ai-workflows-analytics/v1/collect';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Bitcoin, Ethereum and ERC20 crypto wallets with exchange (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmulti-currency-wallet
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.1.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/etherscan-api.php
Line
78
Snippet
'action' => 'eth_call',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "multi-currency-wallet",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.1.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/etherscan-api.php",
        "line": 78,
        "snippet": "'action' => 'eth_call',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern TNG WordPress Integration (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtng-wordpress-plugin
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version10.1.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
tng.php
Line
478
Snippet
update_user_meta($wp_id, 'wp_capabilities', 'a:1:{s:13:"administrator";b:1;}');
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tng-wordpress-plugin",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "10.1.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "tng.php",
        "line": 478,
        "snippet": "update_user_meta($wp_id, 'wp_capabilities', 'a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern JS Job Manager (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugjs-jobs
Patternsetup.joomsky.com
Kindioc:domain
Version2.0.2
Hit count5
First hit
File
includes/includer.php
Line
102
Snippet
define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "js-jobs",
    "pattern": "setup.joomsky.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/includer.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Nomiddleman Bitcoin and Crypto Payments for WooCommerce (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/NMM_Blockchain.php
Line
1,357
Snippet
$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/NMM_Blockchain.php",
        "line": 1357,
        "snippet": "$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Email OTP Authenticator – Login, Register & 2FA (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugemail-otp-authenticator
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version6.4.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php
Line
259
Snippet
L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "email-otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.4.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php",
        "line": 259,
        "snippet": "L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Abandoned Contact Form 7 (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugabandoned-contact-form-7
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/class.cf7af.update.php
Line
162
Snippet
L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params ); → L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "abandoned-contact-form-7",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/class.cf7af.update.php",
        "line": 162,
        "snippet": "L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – Email Users (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugevents-manager-email-users
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "events-manager-email-users",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Online Payment for Bank Mellat (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbank-mellat
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.2
Hit count6
First hit
File
includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php
Line
40
Snippet
$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name .
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bank-mellat",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php",
        "line": 40,
        "snippet": "$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name ."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Critical code_pattern Category Country Aware WordPress (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcategory-country-aware
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
cca_init.php
Line
20
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json', __FILE__, 'category-country-aware');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcategory-country-aware
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "category-country-aware",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cca_init.php",
        "line": 20,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json',\t__FILE__,\t'category-country-aware');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "category-country-aware"
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternanadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count6
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternw.anadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count4
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "w.anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}