Critical code_pattern
Web Server Information Resolved · fp_ipapi_documented_serialized_php_endpoint
6d ago
| Slug | wpheka-web-server-information |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.7 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "wpheka-web-server-information",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.7",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/class-wpheka-info-admin-webserver.php",
"line": 109,
"snippet": "L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php \u2192 L109: $query = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( wp_remote_get( 'http://ip-api.com/php"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}