alexandre67fr

{
    "slug": "formidablepro-2-pdf",
    "previous_version": "3.23",
    "current_version": "3.24",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "fpropdf.php",
            "line": 626,
            "snippet": "L613: $request = wp_remote_get($url);  \u2192  L626: $files = @unserialize($row['value']);",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}

{
    "slug": "formidablepro-2-pdf",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.23",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fpropdf.php",
        "line": 604,
        "snippet": "L591: $request = wp_remote_get($url);  \u2192  L604: $files = @unserialize($row['value']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}