awesomesupport

{
    "slug": "awesome-support",
    "previous_version": "6.3.9",
    "current_version": "6.4.1",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/gas-framework/inc/scssphp/scss.inc.php",
            "line": 3681,
            "snippet": "L3676: $response = wp_remote_get($icache);  \u2192  L3681: $imports = @unserialize( $body, ['allowed_classes' => false] );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}

{
    "slug": "awesome-support",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.3.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/gas-framework/inc/scssphp/scss.inc.php",
        "line": 3675,
        "snippet": "L3670: $response = wp_remote_get($icache);  \u2192  L3675: $imports = @unserialize( $body, ['allowed_classes' => false] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}