Code and Core

{
    "slug": "speedy-go",
    "previous_version": "2.1.1",
    "current_version": "2.1.3",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/api-key-api.php",
            "line": 304,
            "snippet": "L296: $resbody = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L304: while (is_string($opts) && @unserialize($opts, ['allowed_classes' => false]) !== false)",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}

{
    "slug": "speedy-go",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/api-key-api.php",
        "line": 298,
        "snippet": "L290: $resbody = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L298: while (is_string($opts) && @unserialize($opts, ['allowed_classes' => false]) !== false)"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}

{
    "slug": "speedy-go",
    "previous_version": "2.1.0",
    "current_version": "2.1.1",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/api-key-api.php",
            "line": 298,
            "snippet": "L290: $resbody = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L298: while (is_string($opts) && @unserialize($opts, ['allowed_classes' => false]) !== false)",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}