Alexandre Froger

{
    "slug": "woo-alipay",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php",
        "line": 6,
        "snippet": "return new mysqli($connConf[\"host\"], $connConf[\"username\"], $connConf[\"password\"], $connConf[\"dbname\"], $connConf[\"port\"]);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}

{
    "slug": "otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php",
        "line": 36,
        "snippet": "private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}