Events

5,465 events resolved. · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern Forvault Security (40 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugforvault-security
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.0.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/class-armoryf-shell-scanner.php
Line
273
Snippet
'label' => 'blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call literal (smart-contract C2 resolver)',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "forvault-security",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-armoryf-shell-scanner.php",
        "line": 273,
        "snippet": "'label'  => 'blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call literal (smart-contract C2 resolver)',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Low contributor_added STW Media Alt Text from Filename (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsimple-alt-text-generator
New contributorsdurgesh25 sometechwork vineettalwar
Active installs0
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "simple-alt-text-generator",
    "new_contributors": [
        "durgesh25",
        "sometechwork",
        "vineettalwar"
    ],
    "active_installs": 0
}
Low plugin_closed KlickTipp Add-On for Gravity Forms (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugklicktipp-for-gravity-forms
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-10-04 00:00:00
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "klicktipp-for-gravity-forms",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-04 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 10
}
Critical code_pattern Chavosh Affiliate (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugyektanet-affiliate
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
yektanet-affiliate.php
Line
242
Snippet
$request_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yektanet-affiliate",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "yektanet-affiliate.php",
        "line": 242,
        "snippet": "$request_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low plugin_closed Teapot Support (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugteapot-support
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-30 00:00:00
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "teapot-support",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-30 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 10
}
Critical code_pattern wp-idados-crud (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwp-idados-crud
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version0.0.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/idados_functions.php
Line
423
Snippet
$mysqli = new mysqli($tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_host'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_user'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_pass'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_name']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-idados-crud",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.0.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/idados_functions.php",
        "line": 423,
        "snippet": "$mysqli = new mysqli($tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_host'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_user'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_pass'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_name']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern USMS-GH WooCommerce SMS Notification (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugusmsgh-wc-sms-notification
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.0
Hit count4
First hit
File
trunk/lib/UsmsGH.php
Line
23
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "usmsgh-wc-sms-notification",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.0",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "trunk/lib/UsmsGH.php",
        "line": 23,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Stripe Frontend Registration (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugstripe-frontend-registration
Patterndirect_user_insert
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
registration_stripe_form.php
Line
133
Snippet
$insertquery='insert into wp_users (user_login,user_pass,user_nicename,user_email,user_url,user_registered,user_activation_key,user_status,display_name)
Explanationplugin issues a SQL `INSERT INTO ...users (user_login, user_pass, ...)` — bypassing `wp_create_user()`/`wp_insert_user()` to add an account with attacker-controlled credentials. Combined with `serialized_admin_role` this is the textbook hidden-administrator persistence used by the June 2024 credential-stuffing wave.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stripe-frontend-registration",
    "pattern": "direct_user_insert",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "registration_stripe_form.php",
        "line": 133,
        "snippet": "$insertquery='insert into wp_users (user_login,user_pass,user_nicename,user_email,user_url,user_registered,user_activation_key,user_status,display_name)"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin issues a SQL `INSERT INTO ...users (user_login, user_pass, ...)` \u2014 bypassing `wp_create_user()`/`wp_insert_user()` to add an account with attacker-controlled credentials. Combined with `serialized_admin_role` this is the textbook hidden-administrator persistence used by the June 2024 credential-stuffing wave."
}
Critical code_pattern SCM – Smart Currency Manager – Premium Variant for Dokan (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugscd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-dokan
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
scd_update_checker_dokan.php
Line
12
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/
Url hostbitbucket.org
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "scd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-dokan",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "scd_update_checker_dokan.php",
        "line": 12,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/",
    "url_host": "bitbucket.org",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Radio Islam Indonesia (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugradio-islam-indonesia
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version3.15.2015
Hit count5
First hit
File
radio-islam-indonesia.php
Line
217
Snippet
mp3:\"http://119.82.232.92/;stream.mp3\"
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "radio-islam-indonesia",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.15.2015",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "radio-islam-indonesia.php",
        "line": 217,
        "snippet": "mp3:\\\"http://119.82.232.92/;stream.mp3\\\""
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern mind-body (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmind-body-api-integration
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mind-body-api-integration",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern tags.mowster (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmowster-tags
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.71
Hit count1
First hit
File
functions.php
Line
58
Snippet
L54: $request = wp_remote_post('http://wordpress.mowster.net/'.$action, $args); → L58: $response = @unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($request));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mowster-tags",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.71",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "functions.php",
        "line": 58,
        "snippet": "L54: $request = wp_remote_post('http://wordpress.mowster.net/'.$action, $args);  \u2192  L58: $response = @unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($request));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern NFT Login (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugnft-login
Patterneth_getCode
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.2.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-nft-login-util.php
Line
41
Snippet
'method' => 'eth_getCode',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nft-login",
    "pattern": "eth_getCode",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.2.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-nft-login-util.php",
        "line": 41,
        "snippet": "'method' => 'eth_getCode',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Medium code_pattern HT PAY.JP for kintone (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slught-pay-jp-for-kintone
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.11.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
ht-payjp-for-kintone.php
Line
56
Snippet
$my_update_checker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapegithub_self_distro
Urlhttps://github.com/tkc49/PAY.JP-for-kintone-pro/
Url hostgithub.com
Slug arght-payjp-for-kintone
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ht-pay-jp-for-kintone",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.11.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ht-payjp-for-kintone.php",
        "line": 56,
        "snippet": "$my_update_checker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "github_self_distro",
    "url": "https://github.com/tkc49/PAY.JP-for-kintone-pro/",
    "url_host": "github.com",
    "slug_arg": "ht-payjp-for-kintone"
}
Critical code_pattern Jay Access Flickr (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjay-access-flickr
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.6
Hit count10
First hit
File
jay_access_flickr.php
Line
26
Snippet
"<img$1src=\"http://68.142.214.43/$2\"$3>",
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "jay-access-flickr",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.6",
    "hit_count": 10,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "jay_access_flickr.php",
        "line": 26,
        "snippet": "\"<img$1src=\\\"http://68.142.214.43/$2\\\"$3>\","
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern JournalAi (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjournalai
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count3
First hit
File
journalai.php
Line
27
Snippet
'http://100.20.92.101',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "journalai",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "journalai.php",
        "line": 27,
        "snippet": "'http://100.20.92.101',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low contributor_added Future Monitor (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfuture-monitor
New contributorsjanaeggebrecht
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "future-monitor",
    "new_contributors": [
        "janaeggebrecht"
    ],
    "active_installs": 10
}
Low contributor_added Grid Element Trash (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Sluggrid-element-trash
New contributorsjanaeggebrecht palasthotel
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "grid-element-trash",
    "new_contributors": [
        "janaeggebrecht",
        "palasthotel"
    ],
    "active_installs": 10
}
Critical code_pattern Custom Blocks Templates (20 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcustom-blocks-templates
Patternfilter_the_content_in_the_main_loop
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.3.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
lib/block-templates.php
Line
32
Snippet
add_filter( 'the_content', __NAMESPACE__ . '\filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop' );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "custom-blocks-templates",
    "pattern": "filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.3.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/block-templates.php",
        "line": 32,
        "snippet": "add_filter( 'the_content',  __NAMESPACE__ . '\\filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop' );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Church Options (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugchurch-options
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "church-options",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern ABDUL Widget (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugabdul-wp-plugin
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version0.1.3.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
abdulapi/ABDUL.php
Line
20
Snippet
$eventclient = new nusoap_client('http://203.185.132.242/agent/ABDULChatter/wsdl/ABDUL.wsdl', 'wsdl',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "abdul-wp-plugin",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.1.3.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "abdulapi/ABDUL.php",
        "line": 20,
        "snippet": "$eventclient = new nusoap_client('http://203.185.132.242/agent/ABDULChatter/wsdl/ABDUL.wsdl', 'wsdl',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern CityCourier – Local Courier Booking & Tracking System (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcitycourier-local-courier-booking-tracking-system
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
admin/settings-page.php
Line
114
Snippet
'https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', // CF; Date başlığı var
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "citycourier-local-courier-booking-tracking-system",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "admin/settings-page.php",
        "line": 114,
        "snippet": "'https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace',       // CF; Date ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 var"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Moredeal – Monetize your WordPress content (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmoredeal
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.25
Hit count1
First hit
File
application/libs/MoredealRestClient.php
Line
271
Snippet
L251: $error_mess .= ' Server replay: ' . \wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response ); → L271: $res = @unserialize( $response );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moredeal",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.25",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "application/libs/MoredealRestClient.php",
        "line": 271,
        "snippet": "L251: $error_mess       .= ' Server replay: ' . \\wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response );  \u2192  L271: $res = @unserialize( $response );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern QuickTasker (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugquicktasker
PatterngetWPUsers
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.59.1
Hit count7
First hit
File
php/repositories/UserRepository.php
Line
169
Snippet
$wpUsersData = $this->getWPUsers(['include' => $wpUserIds]);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "quicktasker",
    "pattern": "getWPUsers",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.59.1",
    "hit_count": 7,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "php/repositories/UserRepository.php",
        "line": 169,
        "snippet": "$wpUsersData = $this->getWPUsers(['include' => $wpUserIds]);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Zerys Writer Marketplace (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugzerys-writer-marketplace
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count5
First hit
File
place-order.php
Line
9
Snippet
$menu_url = 'http://64.34.208.101/Json/GetMenu/'.$key[0]->apikay.'/'.$_SESSION['cidd'].'/'.$_SESSION['cUserId'];
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "zerys-writer-marketplace",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "place-order.php",
        "line": 9,
        "snippet": "$menu_url =  'http://64.34.208.101/Json/GetMenu/'.$key[0]->apikay.'/'.$_SESSION['cidd'].'/'.$_SESSION['cUserId'];"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern The Loyalty Box – WooCommerce Rewards Program (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugthe-loyalty-box-woocommerce-rewards-program
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.3
Hit count2
First hit
File
trunk/includes/loyaltybox.inc.php
Line
65
Snippet
public static $stateAPIendpoint = "http://54.85.223.200/api/v1/";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "the-loyalty-box-woocommerce-rewards-program",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.3",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "trunk/includes/loyaltybox.inc.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "public static $stateAPIendpoint = \"http://54.85.223.200/api/v1/\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low code_pattern Simple Schema (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsimple-schema
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
simple-schema.php
Line
74
Snippet
$MyUpdateChecker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapepremium_sibling
Urlhttps://bitbucket.org/simpleschemateam/simple-schema-updates/raw/master/info.json
Url hostbitbucket.org
Slug argsimple-schema-updates
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "simple-schema",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "simple-schema.php",
        "line": 74,
        "snippet": "$MyUpdateChecker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "premium_sibling",
    "url": "https://bitbucket.org/simpleschemateam/simple-schema-updates/raw/master/info.json",
    "url_host": "bitbucket.org",
    "slug_arg": "simple-schema-updates"
}
Critical code_pattern Dropshix (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugdropshipping-xox
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.14
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-dropshipping-xox-autoupdate.php
Line
136
Snippet
L132: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L136: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "dropshipping-xox",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.14",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-dropshipping-xox-autoupdate.php",
        "line": 136,
        "snippet": "L132: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L136: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern AIBuy Simple Content Video Player (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugaibuy-player
Patternfilter_the_content_in_the_main_loop
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.0.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
public/class-aibuy_simple_content_video_player-public.php
Line
55
Snippet
function filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop( $content ) {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "aibuy-player",
    "pattern": "filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "public/class-aibuy_simple_content_video_player-public.php",
        "line": 55,
        "snippet": "function filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop( $content ) {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Mensagia for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwoo-mensagia
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
classes/MensagiaSDK.php
Line
212
Snippet
'callback_url' => 'http://195.10.21.174/pass/mensagia_test_callback.php'
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-mensagia",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/MensagiaSDK.php",
        "line": 212,
        "snippet": "'callback_url'  => 'http://195.10.21.174/pass/mensagia_test_callback.php'"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern BotBanish by Randem Systems (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugbotbanish-firewall-client
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version9.0.05
Hit count1
First hit
File
bot/Subs/BotBanish_Subs_DumpDatabase.php
Line
428
Snippet
$conn = new mysqli($dbInfo['server'], $dbInfo['username'], $dbInfo['password'], $dbInfo['database']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "botbanish-firewall-client",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "9.0.05",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bot/Subs/BotBanish_Subs_DumpDatabase.php",
        "line": 428,
        "snippet": "$conn = new mysqli($dbInfo['server'], $dbInfo['username'], $dbInfo['password'], $dbInfo['database']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Digital Publishing Tools for WordPress (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugdigital-publishing
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "digital-publishing",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern artidomo Print on Demand (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugartidomo-print-on-demand
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-one-click-connect.php
Line
150
Snippet
private static $PROXY_URL = 'http://128.140.48.11:3088';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "artidomo-print-on-demand",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-one-click-connect.php",
        "line": 150,
        "snippet": "private static $PROXY_URL = 'http://128.140.48.11:3088';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern VHT SMS (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugvht-sms
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
vht-sms.php
Line
819
Snippet
<SendSMS xmlns="http://203.162.168.170/SendMTAuth/">
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "vht-sms",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "vht-sms.php",
        "line": 819,
        "snippet": "<SendSMS xmlns=\"http://203.162.168.170/SendMTAuth/\">"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Migration Drupal to WordPress (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmigration-drupal-to-wp
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/migration_drupal_to_wp.php
Line
225
Snippet
$wp_capabilities="a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}";
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "migration-drupal-to-wp",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/migration_drupal_to_wp.php",
        "line": 225,
        "snippet": "$wp_capabilities=\"a:1:{s:13:\\\"administrator\\\";b:1;}\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern Dell EDU Connect (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugedu-connect
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version0.1.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
connect.php
Line
26
Snippet
define('DELL_CONNECT_SERVICE_URL','http://11.0.0.1:9001');
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "edu-connect",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.1.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "connect.php",
        "line": 26,
        "snippet": "define('DELL_CONNECT_SERVICE_URL','http://11.0.0.1:9001');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Online Payments for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugonline-payments-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count12
First hit
File
class-wenqy-online-wc-payment-gateway.php
Line
123
Snippet
'default' => 'https://101.231.204.80:5000',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "online-payments-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 12,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class-wenqy-online-wc-payment-gateway.php",
        "line": 123,
        "snippet": "'default' => 'https://101.231.204.80:5000',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern MoceanAPI SendSMS (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmoceanapi-sendsms
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.11
Hit count3
First hit
File
lib/MoceanSMS.php
Line
23
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moceanapi-sendsms",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.11",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/MoceanSMS.php",
        "line": 23,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Paquete.MX (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpaquete-mx
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version4.2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
admin/admin_actions.php
Line
230
Snippet
$baseDownloadLink = isset($config['paquetemx_checkbox_production']) ? 'http://54.201.237.120?trackingNumber=' : 'http://54.201.237.120/dev.php?trackingNumber=';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "paquete-mx",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "admin/admin_actions.php",
        "line": 230,
        "snippet": "$baseDownloadLink = isset($config['paquetemx_checkbox_production']) ? 'http://54.201.237.120?trackingNumber=' : 'http://54.201.237.120/dev.php?trackingNumber=';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern MarketPowerWP (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmarketpowerwp
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.9
Hit count1
First hit
File
leplugin.php
Line
18
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://s3.amazonaws.com/multisoft-wordpress/plugins/marketpowerwp/release.json
Url hosts3.amazonaws.com
Slug argmarketpowerwp
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "marketpowerwp",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.9",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "leplugin.php",
        "line": 18,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://s3.amazonaws.com/multisoft-wordpress/plugins/marketpowerwp/release.json",
    "url_host": "s3.amazonaws.com",
    "slug_arg": "marketpowerwp"
}
Low plugin_closed Parse Markdown (20 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugparse-markdown
Closed reasonauthor-request
Closed date2026-10-04 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "parse-markdown",
    "closed_reason": "author-request",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-04 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}
Low plugin_closed Pardot Marketing (20 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpardot-marketing
Closed reasonauthor-request
Closed date2026-10-04 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "pardot-marketing",
    "closed_reason": "author-request",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-04 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}