| Slug | piotnetforms |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 2,000 |
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "piotnetforms",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 2000
}| Slug | piotnetforms |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 2,000 |
{
"slug": "piotnetforms",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 2000
}| Slug | piotnetforms |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 2,000 |
{
"slug": "piotnetforms",
"new_contributors": [
"piotnetdotcom"
],
"active_installs": 2000
}| Slug | woo-jtl-connector |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-07 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "woo-jtl-connector",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-07 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | woo-poly-integration |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 8,000 |
{
"slug": "woo-poly-integration",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 8000
}| Slug | contact-form-7-signature-addon |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 6,000 |
{
"slug": "contact-form-7-signature-addon",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 6000
}| Slug | ukr-to-lat |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 5,000 |
{
"slug": "ukr-to-lat",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 5000
}| Slug | coinbase-commerce |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 3,000 |
{
"slug": "coinbase-commerce",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 3000
}| Slug | coinbase-commerce |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 3,000 |
{
"slug": "coinbase-commerce",
"new_contributors": [
"commercecb"
],
"active_installs": 3000
}| Slug | document-emberdder |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 9,000 |
{
"slug": "document-emberdder",
"new_contributors": [
"shehabulislam"
],
"active_installs": 9000
}| Slug | bsk-pdf-manager |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 7,000 |
{
"slug": "bsk-pdf-manager",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 7000
}| Slug | subscribe-to-comments |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 10,000 |
{
"slug": "subscribe-to-comments",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 10000
}| Slug | timber-library |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | author-request |
| Closed date | 2026-10-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 20,000 |
{
"slug": "timber-library",
"closed_reason": "author-request",
"closed_date": "2026-10-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 20000
}| Slug | zamok | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.0.7 | ||||||||||||
| Current version | 1.0.8 | ||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "zamok",
"previous_version": "1.0.7",
"current_version": "1.0.8",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "eval_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "modules/enhancement/class-ip-banning.php",
"line": 1049,
"snippet": "if ( preg_match( '#^(?:(?:web|php|wso|c99|r57|mini|bash|cmd|x|b)?shell|sh3ll|c99|r57|alfa(?:-?rex|cgiapi|new)?|wso|b374k|eval(?:-stdin)?|cmd|backdoor|webshell|xleet|adminer(?:-[0-9.]+)?|filemanager",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | woocommerce-gateway-eway | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 3.9.3 | ||||||||||||||
| Current version | 4.0.0 | ||||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "woocommerce-gateway-eway",
"previous_version": "3.9.3",
"current_version": "4.0.0",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/class-wc-gateway-eway.php",
"line": 1718,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_script( 'eway-apple-pay-sdk', 'https://applepay.cdn-apple.com/jsapi/1.latest/apple-pay-sdk.js' );",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://applepay.cdn-apple.com/jsapi/1.latest/apple-pay-sdk.js",
"url_host": "applepay.cdn-apple.com"
}
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | wp-store-locator | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 3.0.3 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| Current version | 3.1.0 | |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| New findings |
| |||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
| New finding count | 6 |
{
"slug": "wp-store-locator",
"previous_version": "3.0.3",
"current_version": "3.1.0",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/onboarding/class-manager.php",
"line": 427,
"snippet": "wp_register_script( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ) . '/mapbox-gl.js', [], wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
},
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/onboarding/class-manager.php",
"line": 428,
"snippet": "wp_register_style( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ) . '/mapbox-gl.css', [], wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
},
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/map-shapes/class-manager.php",
"line": 439,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_script( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . $gl_version . '/mapbox-gl.js', [], $gl_version, true );",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
},
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/map-shapes/class-manager.php",
"line": 440,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_style( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . $gl_version . '/mapbox-gl.css', [], $gl_version );",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
},
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/assets/class-manager.php",
"line": 394,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_script( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ) . '/mapbox-gl.js', '', wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ), true );",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
},
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/admin/assets/class-manager.php",
"line": 395,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_style( 'wpsl-mapbox', 'https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v' . wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ) . '/mapbox-gl.css', [], wpsl_get_script_version( 'mapbox_gl_js' ) );",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://api.mapbox.com/mapbox-gl-js/v",
"url_host": "api.mapbox.com"
}
}
],
"new_finding_count": 6
}| Slug | easy-lightbox-wp |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "easy-lightbox-wp",
"new_contributors": [
"shapedplugin"
],
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | force-update-translations |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "force-update-translations",
"new_contributors": [
"hiroshisato"
],
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | seo-wordpress |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "seo-wordpress",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | cooked |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-10-05 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 3,000 |
{
"slug": "cooked",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 3000
}| Slug | nexura-security | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.0.20 | ||||||||||||
| Current version | 1.0.22 | ||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "nexura-security",
"previous_version": "1.0.20",
"current_version": "1.0.22",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "eval_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/reinfection/class-db-persistence-analyzer.php",
"line": 41,
"snippet": "$suspicious_keywords = [ 'base64_decode', 'eval(', 'system(', 'shell_exec(', 'passthru(', 'assert(' ];",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | prorank-seo | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.6.3 | ||||||||||||
| Current version | 1.6.4 | ||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "prorank-seo",
"previous_version": "1.6.3",
"current_version": "1.6.4",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "base64_decode",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/Core/IntegrationSecrets.php",
"line": 37,
"snippet": "$bytes = base64_decode(substr($value, strlen(self::PREFIX)), true);",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | formglut | ||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.2.0 | ||||||||||||||
| Current version | 1.4.0 | ||||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "formglut",
"previous_version": "1.2.0",
"current_version": "1.4.0",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "remote_enqueue",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/class-formglut-shortcode.php",
"line": 779,
"snippet": "wp_enqueue_script( 'formglut-stripe-js', 'https://js.stripe.com/v3/', array(), null, true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.EnqueuedResourceParameters.MissingVersion -- Stripe requires the unversion",
"confidence": "medium",
"details": {
"url": "https://js.stripe.com/v3/",
"url_host": "js.stripe.com"
}
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | llms-txt-curator | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 2.0.0 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Current version | 2.2.0 | ||||||||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||||||||
| New finding count | 2 |
{
"slug": "llms-txt-curator",
"previous_version": "2.0.0",
"current_version": "2.2.0",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "base64_decode",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/class-llms-txt-publication.php",
"line": 309,
"snippet": "$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- see",
"confidence": "medium"
},
{
"pattern": "gzinflate",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/class-llms-txt-publication.php",
"line": 309,
"snippet": "$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- see",
"confidence": "medium"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 2
}| Slug | verified-crypto-checkout | ||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.56.53 | ||||||||||||||||||
| Current version | 1.56.55 | ||||||||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||||||||
| New finding count | 2 |
{
"slug": "verified-crypto-checkout",
"previous_version": "1.56.53",
"current_version": "1.56.55",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "eth_getCode",
"kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
"file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
"line": 810,
"snippet": "array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),",
"confidence": "high"
},
{
"pattern": "eth_call",
"kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
"file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
"line": 815,
"snippet": "$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );",
"confidence": "high"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 2
}| Slug | fv-player | ||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Previous version | 8.1.7 | ||||||||||||
| Current version | 8.1.8 | ||||||||||||
| New findings |
| ||||||||||||
| New finding count | 1 |
{
"slug": "fv-player",
"previous_version": "8.1.7",
"current_version": "8.1.8",
"new_findings": [
{
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
"line": 324,
"snippet": "L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); \u2192 L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
"confidence": "high"
}
],
"new_finding_count": 1
}| Slug | beautyforms-form-builder |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "beautyforms-form-builder",
"new_contributors": [
"kawsarahmedr"
],
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | fepo-image-font-optimizer |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "fepo-image-font-optimizer",
"new_contributors": [
"michaelpehl"
],
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | local-business-microdata-widget |
|---|---|
| Previous profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/themaab/ |
| Current profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/jamesmm/ |
| Active installs | 20 |
{
"slug": "local-business-microdata-widget",
"previous_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/themaab/",
"current_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/jamesmm/",
"active_installs": 20
}| Slug | calendar-booking |
|---|---|
| Previously closed reason | security-issue |
| Author slug | startbooking |
| Current version | 3.5.18 |
| Active installs | 500 |
| Explanation | Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced. |
{
"slug": "calendar-booking",
"previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
"author_slug": "startbooking",
"current_version": "3.5.18",
"active_installs": 500,
"explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}| Slug | bundlepress |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 10 |
{
"slug": "bundlepress",
"new_contributors": [
"jrmark"
],
"active_installs": 10
}| Slug | socialhero-promotions |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "socialhero-promotions",
"new_contributors": [
"juanpablosh"
],
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | billie-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 30 |
{
"slug": "billie-for-woocommerce",
"new_contributors": [
"billiegmbh"
],
"active_installs": 30
}| Slug | subscription |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "subscription",
"new_contributors": [
"jakariaistauk",
"parvezvai"
],
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | paymob-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 5,000 |
{
"slug": "paymob-for-woocommerce",
"new_contributors": [
"babarzafar"
],
"active_installs": 5000
}| Slug | buddypress-media |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 7,000 |
{
"slug": "buddypress-media",
"new_contributors": [
"intenzi"
],
"active_installs": 7000
}| Slug | slider-wd |
|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.2.62 |
| Current version | 1.2.63 |
| Dormancy days | 648 |
| Active installs | 10,000 |
| Serial offender note | Severity bumped medium→high: author 10web has 6 prior security-issue closures on wp.org. |
{
"slug": "slider-wd",
"previous_version": "1.2.62",
"current_version": "1.2.63",
"dormancy_days": 648,
"active_installs": 10000,
"serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped medium\u2192high: author 10web has 6 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}| Slug | blank-slate |
|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.2.1 |
| Current version | 1.3.0 |
| Dormancy days | 1,305 |
| Active installs | 10,000 |
{
"slug": "blank-slate",
"previous_version": "1.2.1",
"current_version": "1.3.0",
"dormancy_days": 1305,
"active_installs": 10000
}| Slug | vulnity |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | temporary |
| Closed date | 2026-09-24 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 40 |
{
"slug": "vulnity",
"closed_reason": "temporary",
"closed_date": "2026-09-24 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 40
}| Slug | fireems-stats |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 4.0.1 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | hijack |
| Url | http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json |
| Url host | upgrade.maltesesolutions.com |
| Slug arg | fireems-stats |
{
"slug": "fireems-stats",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "4.0.1",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "fireems-stats.php",
"line": 67,
"snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "hijack",
"url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
"url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
"slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}| Slug | wp-downgrade |
|---|---|
| Previous version | 1.2.6 |
| Current version | 1.2.7 |
| Dormancy days | 1,246 |
| Active installs | 100,000 |
{
"slug": "wp-downgrade",
"previous_version": "1.2.6",
"current_version": "1.2.7",
"dormancy_days": 1246,
"active_installs": 100000
}| Slug | xmas-widget |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "xmas-widget",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.0",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "xmas-widget.php",
"line": 333,
"snippet": "L320: $request = wp_remote_get( \u2192 L333: $data = @unserialize($request['body']);"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | my-press |
|---|---|
| Pattern | direct_mysqli_connect |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.01 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape. |
{
"slug": "my-press",
"pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.01",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "mypress.php",
"line": 106,
"snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $config['database']['hostname'], $config['database']['username'], $config['database']['password'], $config['database']['database'] );"
},
"explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}| Slug | sms-verification-pars |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.1 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "sms-verification-pars",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.1",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "gateways.php",
"line": 88,
"snippet": "$baseurl = \"http://37.130.202.188/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php\";"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | simply-documents |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.0 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "simply-documents",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.0",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php",
"line": 102,
"snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); \u2192 L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | corona-test-results |
|---|---|
| Pattern | decode_write_dropper |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.11.6 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path — the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote. |
{
"slug": "corona-test-results",
"pattern": "decode_write_dropper",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.11.6",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "corona-test-results-admin-settings.php",
"line": 1198,
"snippet": "define( \\'CTR_ENCRYPTION_KEY\\', base64_decode( \\'' . base64_encode( DataEncryption::getRandomKey() ) . '\\' ) );';"
},
"explanation": "a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path \u2014 the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote."
}| Slug | jovvie-in-person-payments-givewp |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.1.5 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | github_self_distro |
| Url | https://github.com/SupportBizSwoop/Jovvie-Payments-Gateway-GiveWP |
| Url host | github.com |
| Slug arg | — |
{
"slug": "jovvie-in-person-payments-givewp",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.1.5",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/Setup.php",
"line": 48,
"snippet": "$updateChecker = \\Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "github_self_distro",
"url": "https://github.com/SupportBizSwoop/Jovvie-Payments-Gateway-GiveWP",
"url_host": "github.com",
"slug_arg": null
}| Slug | tweetboost |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.1.0 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "tweetboost",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.1.0",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "assets/plugins/acf/includes/early-access.php",
"line": 102,
"snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); \u2192 L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | mercado |
|---|---|
| Pattern | direct_mysqli_connect |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.3.0 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape. |
{
"slug": "mercado",
"pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.3.0",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "public/rtwmer-class-mercado-public.php",
"line": 1629,
"snippet": "$conn = new mysqli($rtwmer_sql_details['host'],$rtwmer_sql_details['user'],$rtwmer_sql_details['pass'],$rtwmer_sql_details['db']);// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.RestrictedClasses.mysql__mysqli"
},
"explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}| Slug | tidybot |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.9.85 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | unparseable |
| Url | — |
| Url host | — |
| Slug arg | — |
{
"slug": "tidybot",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.9.85",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/Updates.php",
"line": 26,
"snippet": "$update_checker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "unparseable",
"url": null,
"url_host": null,
"slug_arg": null
}| Slug | wp-roster |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.30 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | vendor_updater |
| Url | https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-roster |
| Url host | northernbeacheswebsites.com.au |
| Slug arg | wp-roster |
{
"slug": "wp-roster",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.30",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "wp-roster.php",
"line": 489,
"snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_wp_roster = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "vendor_updater",
"url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-roster",
"url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
"slug_arg": "wp-roster"
}