Events

445 events resolved (filtered). · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern NextScripts: Social Networks Auto-Poster (20k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsocial-networks-auto-poster-facebook-twitter-g
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version4.4.7
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/nxs_class_snap.php
Line
105
Snippet
nxs_cURLTest("http://45.79.4.45/", "HTTPS to NXSA", "NXS");
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "social-networks-auto-poster-facebook-twitter-g",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.4.7",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/nxs_class_snap.php",
        "line": 105,
        "snippet": "nxs_cURLTest(\"http://45.79.4.45/\", \"HTTPS to NXSA\", \"NXS\");"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Database Backup – Unlimited Database & Files Backup by Backup for WP (20k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-database-backup
Patternwpconfig_creds_string
Kindbuiltin
Version7.10
Hit count10
First hit
File
includes/admin/class-wpdbbkp-restore.php
Line
180
Snippet
preg_match("/'DB_NAME',\s*'(.*)?'/", $config_file, $matches);
Explanationplugin source contains a literal string `"DB_NAME"` / `"DB_USER"` / `"DB_PASSWORD"` / `"DB_HOST"` — the credential constants are referenced by name only when something is parsing wp-config.php to harvest the database password, which legitimate plugins essentially never do. Signature of the June 2024 credential-stuffing payload that walked the filesystem looking for wp-config files and exfiltrated DB creds. wp-config itself uses these as constants (no surrounding quotes); plugin code that quotes them is the malicious shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-database-backup",
    "pattern": "wpconfig_creds_string",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.10",
    "hit_count": 10,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/admin/class-wpdbbkp-restore.php",
        "line": 180,
        "snippet": "preg_match(\"/'DB_NAME',\\s*'(.*)?'/\", $config_file, $matches);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains a literal string `\"DB_NAME\"` / `\"DB_USER\"` / `\"DB_PASSWORD\"` / `\"DB_HOST\"` \u2014 the credential constants are referenced by name only when something is parsing wp-config.php to harvest the database password, which legitimate plugins essentially never do. Signature of the June 2024 credential-stuffing payload that walked the filesystem looking for wp-config files and exfiltrated DB creds. wp-config itself uses these as constants (no surrounding quotes); plugin code that quotes them is the malicious shape."
}
Critical code_pattern افزونه پیامک ووکامرس | Persian WooCommerce SMS (50k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpersian-woocommerce-sms
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version7.1.1
Hit count17
First hit
File
src/Gateways/PanelChi.php
Line
11
Snippet
public string $api_url = 'http://185.141.171.123/wbs/send.php?wsdl';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "persian-woocommerce-sms",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 17,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/Gateways/PanelChi.php",
        "line": 11,
        "snippet": "public string $api_url = 'http://185.141.171.123/wbs/send.php?wsdl';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern LearnPress – WordPress LMS Plugin for Create and Sell Online Courses (60k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluglearnpress
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version4.3.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/admin/lp-admin-functions.php
Line
806
Snippet
'%' . $wpdb->esc_like( 's:13:"administrator"' ) . '%',
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "learnpress",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.3.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/admin/lp-admin-functions.php",
        "line": 806,
        "snippet": "'%' . $wpdb->esc_like( 's:13:\"administrator\"' ) . '%',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern Starter Sites & Templates by Neve (100k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtemplates-patterns-collection
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.27
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/TI_Beaver.php
Line
167
Snippet
L148: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) ); → L167: if ( @unserialize( $serialized_string ) !== true && preg_match( '/^[aOs]:/', $serialized
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "templates-patterns-collection",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.27",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/TI_Beaver.php",
        "line": 167,
        "snippet": "L148: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) );  \u2192  L167: if ( @unserialize( $serialized_string ) !== true && preg_match( '/^[aOs]:/', $serialized"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern NinjaFirewall (WP Edition) – Advanced Security Plugin and Firewall (100k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugninjafirewall
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/utils.php
Line
1,319
Snippet
if ( strpos( $value, 's:13:"administrator"') === FALSE &&
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ninjafirewall",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/utils.php",
        "line": 1319,
        "snippet": "if ( strpos( $value, 's:13:\"administrator\"') === FALSE &&"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern NinjaFirewall (WP Edition) – Advanced Security Plugin and Firewall (100k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugninjafirewall
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/help.php
Line
250
Snippet
<p><strong>' . __('Block HTTP requests with an IP in the <code>HTTP_HOST</code> header', 'ninjafirewall'). '</strong><br />' . sprintf( __('This option will reject any request using an IP instead of
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ninjafirewall",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/help.php",
        "line": 250,
        "snippet": "<p><strong>' . __('Block HTTP requests with an IP in the <code>HTTP_HOST</code> header', 'ninjafirewall'). '</strong><br />' . sprintf( __('This option will reject any request using an IP instead of"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Flexible SSL for CloudFlare (100k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugcloudflare-flexible-ssl
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.3.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
plugin.php
Line
4
Snippet
* Plugin URI: https://icwp.io/cloudflaresslpluginauthor
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "cloudflare-flexible-ssl",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.3.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "plugin.php",
        "line": 4,
        "snippet": "* Plugin URI: https://icwp.io/cloudflaresslpluginauthor"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern GTM4WP – A Google Tag Manager (GTM) plugin for WordPress (700k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugduracelltomi-google-tag-manager
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.22.3
Hit count38
First hit
File
integration/whichbrowser/data/profiles.php
Line
647
Snippet
'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML' => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "duracelltomi-google-tag-manager",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.22.3",
    "hit_count": 38,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "integration/whichbrowser/data/profiles.php",
        "line": 647,
        "snippet": "'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML'                                              => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Slugduplicator
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version1.5.16
Hit count1
First hit
File
installer/dup-installer/classes/config/class.conf.wp.php
Line
22
Snippet
const ADMIN_SERIALIZED_SECURITY_STRING = 'a:1:{s:13:"administrator";b:1;}';
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "duplicator",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.5.16",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "installer/dup-installer/classes/config/class.conf.wp.php",
        "line": 22,
        "snippet": "const ADMIN_SERIALIZED_SECURITY_STRING = 'a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Slugchatbot
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version8.2.4
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php
Line
190
Snippet
L185: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L190: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "chatbot",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.2.4",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 190,
        "snippet": "L185: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L190: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern YARPP – Yet Another Related Posts Plugin (100k+ installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugyet-another-related-posts-plugin
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version5.30.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
classes/YARPP_Core.php
Line
2,112
Snippet
L2105: $remote = wp_remote_post( "https://yarpp.org/checkversion.php?format=php&version={$vers → L2112: if ( $result = @unserialize( $remote['body'] ) ) {
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yet-another-related-posts-plugin",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.30.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/YARPP_Core.php",
        "line": 2112,
        "snippet": "L2105: $remote  = wp_remote_post( \"https://yarpp.org/checkversion.php?format=php&version={$vers  \u2192  L2112: if ( $result = @unserialize( $remote['body'] ) ) {"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Slugwp-webhooks
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version3.4.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
core/includes/integrations/wordpress/triggers/create_user.php
Line
249
Snippet
0 => 'a:1:{s:13:"administrator";b:1;}',
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-webhooks",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.4.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "core/includes/integrations/wordpress/triggers/create_user.php",
        "line": 249,
        "snippet": "0 => 'a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern Content Egg – Affiliate Product Importer & Price Comparison (10k+ installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugcontent-egg
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version11.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
application/libs/RestClient.php
Line
240
Snippet
L224: $error_mess .= ' Server replay: ' . \wp_remote_retrieve_body($response); → L240: $res = @unserialize($response);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "content-egg",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "11.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "application/libs/RestClient.php",
        "line": 240,
        "snippet": "L224: $error_mess .= ' Server replay: ' . \\wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L240: $res = @unserialize($response);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Content Egg – Affiliate Product Importer & Price Comparison (10k+ installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugcontent-egg
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version11.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
application/libs/admitad/AdmitadProducts.php
Line
22
Snippet
const API_URI_BASE = 'http://185.58.206.88/wp';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "content-egg",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "11.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "application/libs/admitad/AdmitadProducts.php",
        "line": 22,
        "snippet": "const API_URI_BASE = 'http://185.58.206.88/wp';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern OSM – OpenStreetMap (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugosm
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version6.2.5
Hit count2
First hit
File
osm_map/osm-oljs2.php
Line
269
Snippet
$Layer .= 'var layerOSMHillshadeMap = new OpenLayers.Layer.TMS("OSMHillshadeMap", " http://129.206.74.245:8004/tms_hs.ashx?x={x}&y={y}&z={z} ",{ numZoomLevels: 18, type: "png", getURL: getTi
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "osm",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.2.5",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "osm_map/osm-oljs2.php",
        "line": 269,
        "snippet": "$Layer .= 'var layerOSMHillshadeMap   = new OpenLayers.Layer.TMS(\"OSMHillshadeMap\", \" http://129.206.74.245:8004/tms_hs.ashx?x={x}&y={y}&z={z} \",{ numZoomLevels: 18, type: \"png\", getURL: getTi"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Core Framework (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugcore-framework
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.10.2
Hit count3
First hit
File
wp/App/Backend/Settings.php
Line
51
Snippet
if (isset($preset['pluginAuthor'])) {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "core-framework",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.10.2",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp/App/Backend/Settings.php",
        "line": 51,
        "snippet": "if (isset($preset['pluginAuthor'])) {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern PowerPress Podcasting plugin by Blubrry (20k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpowerpress
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version11.16.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
powerpress.php
Line
71
Snippet
$affectedusernames = ['PluginAUTH', 'PluginGuest', 'Options'];
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "powerpress",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "11.16.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "powerpress.php",
        "line": 71,
        "snippet": "$affectedusernames = ['PluginAUTH', 'PluginGuest', 'Options'];"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternwpos_monthly_cron_hook
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
69
Snippet
add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "wpos_monthly_cron_hook",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 69,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternhttps://analytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:url
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count5
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "https://analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:url",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternwpos_process_monthly_data
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
545
Snippet
$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "wpos_process_monthly_data",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 545,
        "snippet": "$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternwpos_get_plugin_version_by_file
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
657
Snippet
$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 657,
        "snippet": "$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternwpos_handle_analytics_request
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
593
Snippet
'callback' => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "wpos_handle_analytics_request",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 593,
        "snippet": "'callback'            => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternwpos_rest_api_init
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
72
Snippet
add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "wpos_rest_api_init",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 72,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
PatternWpos_Anylc_Admin
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count6
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
15
Snippet
class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "Wpos_Anylc_Admin",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 15,
        "snippet": "class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
696
Snippet
L690: $data = @file_get_contents($url); → L696: $info = @unserialize($data);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 696,
        "snippet": "L690: $data = @file_get_contents($url);  \u2192  L696: $info = @unserialize($data);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Trending/Popular Post Slider and Widget (2k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-trending-post-slider-and-widget
Patternanalytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:domain
Version1.8.6.1
Hit count6
First hit
File
wp-trending-post-slider-widget.php
Line
37
Snippet
<p><?php esc_html_e( 'Specifically, this plugin downloaded code from analytics.essentialplugin.com and installed it in your site, while the specific case can differ, we know that they were installin
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-trending-post-slider-and-widget",
    "pattern": "analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "1.8.6.1",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-trending-post-slider-widget.php",
        "line": 37,
        "snippet": "<p><?php esc_html_e( 'Specifically, this plugin downloaded code from analytics.essentialplugin.com and installed it in your site, while the specific case can differ, we know that they were installin"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
PatternPlugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-slick-image-slider.php
Line
295
Snippet
/* Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts */
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-slick-image-slider.php",
        "line": 295,
        "snippet": "/* Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts */"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternwpos_monthly_cron_hook
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count4
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
69
Snippet
add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "wpos_monthly_cron_hook",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 69,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternhttps://analytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:url
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count5
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "https://analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:url",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternanalytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:domain
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count6
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternwpos_process_monthly_data
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count3
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
546
Snippet
$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "wpos_process_monthly_data",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 546,
        "snippet": "$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternwpos_get_plugin_version_by_file
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
658
Snippet
$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 658,
        "snippet": "$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternwpos_handle_analytics_request
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
594
Snippet
'callback' => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "wpos_handle_analytics_request",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 594,
        "snippet": "'callback'            => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternwpos_rest_api_init
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
72
Snippet
add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "wpos_rest_api_init",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 72,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
PatternWpos_Anylc_Admin
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count6
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
15
Snippet
class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "Wpos_Anylc_Admin",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 15,
        "snippet": "class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Slick Slider and Image Carousel (10k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.7.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
697
Snippet
L691: $data = @file_get_contents($url); → L697: $info = @unserialize($data);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-slick-slider-and-image-carousel",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.7.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 697,
        "snippet": "L691: $data = @file_get_contents($url);  \u2192  L697: $info = @unserialize($data);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternwpos_monthly_cron_hook
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
69
Snippet
add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "wpos_monthly_cron_hook",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 69,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook', array($this, 'wpos_monthly_cron_hook_fn') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternhttps://analytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:url
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count5
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
17
Snippet
public $analytics_endpoint = 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "https://analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:url",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "public $analytics_endpoint\t= 'https://analytics.essentialplugin.com';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternwpos_process_monthly_data
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
545
Snippet
$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "wpos_process_monthly_data",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 545,
        "snippet": "$this->wpos_process_monthly_data( $this->analytics_slugs );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternwpos_get_plugin_version_by_file
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
657
Snippet
$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 657,
        "snippet": "$version = $this->wpos_get_plugin_version_by_file($matching_product['file']);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternwpos_handle_analytics_request
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
593
Snippet
'callback' => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "wpos_handle_analytics_request",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 593,
        "snippet": "'callback'            => array( $this, 'wpos_handle_analytics_request' ),"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternwpos_rest_api_init
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
72
Snippet
add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "wpos_rest_api_init",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 72,
        "snippet": "add_action( 'rest_api_init', array($this, 'wpos_rest_api_init') );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
PatternWpos_Anylc_Admin
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count6
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
15
Snippet
class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "Wpos_Anylc_Admin",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 15,
        "snippet": "class Wpos_Anylc_Admin {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php
Line
696
Snippet
L690: $data = @file_get_contents($url); → L696: $info = @unserialize($data);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wpos-analytics/includes/class-anylc-admin.php",
        "line": 696,
        "snippet": "L690: $data = @file_get_contents($url);  \u2192  L696: $info = @unserialize($data);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
PatternPlugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-recent-post-slider.php
Line
282
Snippet
/* Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts */
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-recent-post-slider.php",
        "line": 282,
        "snippet": "/* Plugin Wpos Analytics Data Starts */"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WP Responsive Recent Post Slider/Carousel (20k+ installs) Malicious 6mo ago
Slugwp-responsive-recent-post-slider
Patternanalytics.essentialplugin.com
Kindioc:domain
Version3.7.1.1
Hit count6
First hit
File
wp-recent-post-slider.php
Line
35
Snippet
<p><?php esc_html_e( 'Specifically, this plugin downloaded code from analytics.essentialplugin.com and installed it in your site, while the specific case can differ, we know that they were installin
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-responsive-recent-post-slider",
    "pattern": "analytics.essentialplugin.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "3.7.1.1",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-recent-post-slider.php",
        "line": 35,
        "snippet": "<p><?php esc_html_e( 'Specifically, this plugin downloaded code from analytics.essentialplugin.com and installed it in your site, while the specific case can differ, we know that they were installin"
    },
    "explanation": null
}