Critical code_pattern
Resolved · audit:benign
2026-04-30 11:06:27 (2d ago)
| Slug | chatbot |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 8.2.4 |
| Hit count | 2 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "chatbot",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "8.2.4",
"hit_count": 2,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
"line": 190,
"snippet": "L185: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); \u2192 L190: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}