| Slug | inet-webkit |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-08 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "inet-webkit",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | inet-webkit |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-08 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "inet-webkit",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | wp-magnific-popup |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-07 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "wp-magnific-popup",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | smart-search-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-08 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "smart-search-for-woocommerce",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | gd-security-headers |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-08 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 1,000 |
{
"slug": "gd-security-headers",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 1000
}| Slug | elementinvader-addons-for-elementor |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-07 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 3,000 |
{
"slug": "elementinvader-addons-for-elementor",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 3000
}| Slug | adminify |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-08 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 7,000 |
{
"slug": "adminify",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 7000
}| Slug | docs-viewer-add-on-for-wp-job-openings |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | author-request |
| Closed date | 2026-05-07 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 6,000 |
{
"slug": "docs-viewer-add-on-for-wp-job-openings",
"closed_reason": "author-request",
"closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 6000
}| Slug | recaptcha-for-asgaros-forum |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-07 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 5,000 |
{
"slug": "recaptcha-for-asgaros-forum",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 5000
}| Slug | cf7-grid-layout |
|---|---|
| Previous version | 4.15.8 |
| Current version | 4.16.0 |
| Dormancy days | 694 |
| Active installs | 10,000 |
{
"slug": "cf7-grid-layout",
"previous_version": "4.15.8",
"current_version": "4.16.0",
"dormancy_days": 694,
"active_installs": 10000
}| Slug | automatic-domain-changer |
|---|---|
| Previous version | 2.0.4 |
| Current version | 3.0.1 |
| Dormancy days | 388 |
| Active installs | 10,000 |
{
"slug": "automatic-domain-changer",
"previous_version": "2.0.4",
"current_version": "3.0.1",
"dormancy_days": 388,
"active_installs": 10000
}| Slug | beautify-cursor |
|---|---|
| Previous profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/mmaumio/ |
| Current profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/dba6060/ |
| Active installs | 20 |
{
"slug": "beautify-cursor",
"previous_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/mmaumio/",
"current_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/dba6060/",
"active_installs": 20
}| Slug | trunkrs-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| Previous profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/fean/ |
| Current profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/chlododev/ |
| Active installs | 20 |
{
"slug": "trunkrs-for-woocommerce",
"previous_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/fean/",
"current_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/chlododev/",
"active_installs": 20
}| Slug | wp-appbox |
|---|---|
| Author slug | marcelismus |
| Burst start | 2026-04-26 19:15:18 |
| Burst end | 2026-04-26 19:18:43 |
| Burst commits | 12 |
| Burst window minutes | 90 |
| Tenure days | 1,439 |
| Distinct messages | 1 |
| Avg message length | 7 |
| Top message | v4.5.12 |
| Top message count | 12 |
| Prt revert | — |
| Explanation | Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days. |
{
"slug": "wp-appbox",
"author_slug": "marcelismus",
"burst_start": "2026-04-26 19:15:18",
"burst_end": "2026-04-26 19:18:43",
"burst_commits": 12,
"burst_window_minutes": 90,
"tenure_days": 1439,
"distinct_messages": 1,
"avg_message_length": 7,
"top_message": "v4.5.12",
"top_message_count": 12,
"prt_revert": null,
"explanation": "Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days."
}| Slug | zalomeni |
|---|---|
| Previously closed reason | security-issue |
| Author slug | vyskoczilova |
| Current version | 2.0.0 |
| Active installs | 7,000 |
| Explanation | Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced. |
{
"slug": "zalomeni",
"previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
"author_slug": "vyskoczilova",
"current_version": "2.0.0",
"active_installs": 7000,
"explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}| Slug | sola-testimonials |
|---|---|
| Previously closed reason | security-issue |
| Author slug | solaplugins |
| Current version | 3.0.1 |
| Active installs | 300 |
| Explanation | Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced. |
{
"slug": "sola-testimonials",
"previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
"author_slug": "solaplugins",
"current_version": "3.0.1",
"active_installs": 300,
"explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}| Slug | category-popular-tags |
|---|---|
| Previous profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/kusimo/ |
| Current profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/sidocode/ |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "category-popular-tags",
"previous_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/kusimo/",
"current_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/sidocode/",
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | quick-download-button |
|---|---|
| Previous profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/kusimo/ |
| Current profile | https://profiles.wordpress.org/sidocode/ |
| Active installs | 2,000 |
{
"slug": "quick-download-button",
"previous_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/kusimo/",
"current_profile": "https://profiles.wordpress.org/sidocode/",
"active_installs": 2000
}| Slug | sola-testimonials |
|---|---|
| Previously closed reason | security-issue |
| Author slug | solaplugins |
| Current version | 3.0.1 |
| Active installs | 300 |
| Explanation | Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced. |
{
"slug": "sola-testimonials",
"previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
"author_slug": "solaplugins",
"current_version": "3.0.1",
"active_installs": 300,
"explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}| Author slug | smallplugins |
|---|---|
| Changelog line | * Dev: Update freemius SDK and maintenance update. |
| Plugin count | 3 |
| Plugin slugs | |
| Versions | |
| Window start | 2026-04-27 15:42:18 |
| Window end | 2026-04-29 16:10:43 |
| Total installs | 600 |
| Recent committer joins | 1 |
| Explanation | Same changelog first-line reused across ≥3 plugins within 14 days by a committer who recently (<12 months) became attached to at least one of them. Decoy-commit campaign pattern — the Essential Plugin incident used a single "Check compatibility with WordPress version 6.8.2" line across 31 plugins to disguise the initial malicious push. |
{
"author_slug": "smallplugins",
"changelog_line": "* Dev: Update freemius SDK and maintenance update.",
"plugin_count": 3,
"plugin_slugs": [
"query-loop-post-selector",
"exclude-link-suggestions",
"automatic-block-inserter"
],
"versions": [
"1.0.6",
"1.0.9",
"1.0.2"
],
"window_start": "2026-04-27 15:42:18",
"window_end": "2026-04-29 16:10:43",
"total_installs": 600,
"recent_committer_joins": 1,
"explanation": "Same changelog first-line reused across \u22653 plugins within 14 days by a committer who recently (<12 months) became attached to at least one of them. Decoy-commit campaign pattern \u2014 the Essential Plugin incident used a single \"Check compatibility with WordPress version 6.8.2\" line across 31 plugins to disguise the initial malicious push."
}| Slug | anteraja |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.2 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "anteraja",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.2",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "epeken-anteraja.php",
"line": 86,
"snippet": "$server = 'http://103.252.101.131';"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | woo-dpd |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.0.11 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "woo-dpd",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.0.11",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib/dpd-sdk/src/lib/API/Service/TrackingOrder.php",
"line": 13,
"snippet": "const TEST_API_URL = 'http://91.209.80.50:9090/ordertracking ';"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | speedaf-express-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.0.3 |
| Hit count | 2 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "speedaf-express-for-woocommerce",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.0.3",
"hit_count": 2,
"first_hit": {
"file": "sdk/Configuration.php",
"line": 8,
"snippet": "'base_path' => API_DEBUG ? 'http://8.214.27.92:8480/' : 'https://apis.speedaf.com/', // kinldy replace this with the LIVE PATH like 'api.speedaf.com'"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | knowledgebase-helpdesk |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 3.7.3 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "knowledgebase-helpdesk",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "3.7.3",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
"line": 189,
"snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); \u2192 L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | moceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.4.12 |
| Hit count | 3 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "moceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.4.12",
"hit_count": 3,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib/MoceanSMS.php",
"line": 24,
"snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | joomla-15-importer |
|---|---|
| Pattern | direct_mysqli_connect |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.0.0 |
| Hit count | 2 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape. |
{
"slug": "joomla-15-importer",
"pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.0.0",
"hit_count": 2,
"first_hit": {
"file": "joomla-15-importer.php",
"line": 177,
"snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $db_info[ 'hostname' ], $db_info[ 'username' ], $db_info[ 'password' ], $db_info[ 'database' ], $db_info[ 'port' ] );"
},
"explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}| Slug | woo-alipay |
|---|---|
| Pattern | direct_mysqli_connect |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.1.3 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape. |
{
"slug": "woo-alipay",
"pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.1.3",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php",
"line": 6,
"snippet": "return new mysqli($connConf[\"host\"], $connConf[\"username\"], $connConf[\"password\"], $connConf[\"dbname\"], $connConf[\"port\"]);"
},
"explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}| Slug | is-there-a-problem |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.1.6 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | github_self_distro |
| Url | https://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem |
| Url host | github.com |
| Slug arg | is_there_a_problem |
{
"slug": "is-there-a-problem",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.1.6",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "is-there-a-problem.php",
"line": 413,
"snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "github_self_distro",
"url": "https://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem",
"url_host": "github.com",
"slug_arg": "is_there_a_problem"
}| Slug | gf-campaign-fields |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.4.1 |
| Hit count | 38 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "gf-campaign-fields",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.4.1",
"hit_count": 38,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib/whichbrowser/parser/data/profiles.php",
"line": 600,
"snippet": "'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML' => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | otp-authenticator |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.1 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "otp-authenticator",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.1",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php",
"line": 36,
"snippet": "private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | stonehenge-em-slider |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 1.8.7 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | unparseable |
| Url | — |
| Url host | — |
| Slug arg | — |
{
"slug": "stonehenge-em-slider",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.8.7",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
"line": 49,
"snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "unparseable",
"url": null,
"url_host": null,
"slug_arg": null
}| Slug | stn-save-to-nextcloud |
|---|---|
| Pattern | direct_mysqli_connect |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.4.6 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape. |
{
"slug": "stn-save-to-nextcloud",
"pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.4.6",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "inc/CreateBDD.php",
"line": 30,
"snippet": "$mysqli = new mysqli($thisBDD['DB_HOST'], $thisBDD['DB_USER'], $thisBDD['DB_PASSWORD'], $thisBDD['DB_NAME']);"
},
"explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}| Slug | multi-currency-wallet |
|---|---|
| Pattern | eth_call |
| Kind | ioc:code_pattern |
| Version | 1.1.5 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | — |
{
"slug": "multi-currency-wallet",
"pattern": "eth_call",
"kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
"version": "1.1.5",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/etherscan-api.php",
"line": 78,
"snippet": "'action' => 'eth_call',"
},
"explanation": null
}| Slug | ai-workflow-automation-lite |
|---|---|
| Pattern | $analytics_endpoint |
| Kind | ioc:code_pattern |
| Version | 1.4.2 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | — |
{
"slug": "ai-workflow-automation-lite",
"pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
"kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
"version": "1.4.2",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/class-wp-ai-workflows-analytics-collector.php",
"line": 5,
"snippet": "private $analytics_endpoint = 'https://wpaiworkflows.com/wp-json/wp-ai-workflows-analytics/v1/collect';"
},
"explanation": null
}| Slug | godam |
|---|---|
| Pattern | $analytics_endpoint |
| Kind | ioc:code_pattern |
| Version | 1.8.0 |
| Hit count | 4 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | — |
{
"slug": "godam",
"pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
"kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
"version": "1.8.0",
"hit_count": 4,
"first_hit": {
"file": "inc/classes/rest-api/class-analytics.php",
"line": 166,
"snippet": "$analytics_endpoint = RTGODAM_ANALYTICS_BASE . '/processed-analytics/fetch/';"
},
"explanation": null
}| Slug | tng-wordpress-plugin |
|---|---|
| Pattern | serialized_admin_role |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 10.1.4 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand. |
{
"slug": "tng-wordpress-plugin",
"pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "10.1.4",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "tng.php",
"line": 478,
"snippet": "update_user_meta($wp_id, 'wp_capabilities', 'a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}');"
},
"explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}| Slug | js-jobs |
|---|---|
| Pattern | setup.joomsky.com |
| Kind | ioc:domain |
| Version | 2.0.2 |
| Hit count | 5 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | — |
{
"slug": "js-jobs",
"pattern": "setup.joomsky.com",
"kind": "ioc:domain",
"version": "2.0.2",
"hit_count": 5,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/includer.php",
"line": 102,
"snippet": "define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');"
},
"explanation": null
}| Slug | email-otp-authenticator |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 6.4.1 |
| Hit count | 4 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "email-otp-authenticator",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "6.4.1",
"hit_count": 4,
"first_hit": {
"file": "lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php",
"line": 259,
"snippet": "L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); \u2192 L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | nomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.4.8 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "nomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.4.8",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "src/NMM_Blockchain.php",
"line": 1357,
"snippet": "$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;"
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | bank-mellat |
|---|---|
| Pattern | hardcoded_ip_url |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.0.2 |
| Hit count | 6 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths. |
{
"slug": "bank-mellat",
"pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.0.2",
"hit_count": 6,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php",
"line": 40,
"snippet": "$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name ."
},
"explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}| Slug | events-manager-email-users |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 4.8.2 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | unparseable |
| Url | — |
| Url host | — |
| Slug arg | — |
{
"slug": "events-manager-email-users",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "4.8.2",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
"line": 49,
"snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "unparseable",
"url": null,
"url_host": null,
"slug_arg": null
}| Slug | abandoned-contact-form-7 |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.2 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
{
"slug": "abandoned-contact-form-7",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.2",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "inc/class.cf7af.update.php",
"line": 162,
"snippet": "L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params ); \u2192 L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}| Slug | ideapush |
|---|---|
| Pattern | puc_update_hijack |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 8.77 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal. |
| Shape | vendor_updater |
| Url | https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush |
| Url host | northernbeacheswebsites.com.au |
| Slug arg | ideapush |
{
"slug": "ideapush",
"pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "8.77",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "ideapush.php",
"line": 1220,
"snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
},
"explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
"shape": "vendor_updater",
"url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
"url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
"slug_arg": "ideapush"
}| Slug | bolt-cta-button | ||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Active installs | 1,000 | ||||||
| Is closed | no | ||||||
| Prt committers | |||||||
| First touch | 2026-04-23 10:33:46 | ||||||
| Last touch | 2026-04-23 10:33:46 | ||||||
| Commit count | 1 | ||||||
| Commits sample |
| ||||||
| Lookback days | 30 | ||||||
| Explanation | wp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident. |
{
"slug": "bolt-cta-button",
"active_installs": 1000,
"is_closed": false,
"prt_committers": [
"plugin-master"
],
"first_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
"last_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
"commit_count": 1,
"commits_sample": [
{
"committer": "plugin-master",
"at": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
"message": "Adding Bolt CTA Button by ismeteroglu."
}
],
"lookback_days": 30,
"explanation": "wp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident."
}| Slug | wp-travel |
|---|---|
| Author slug | wptravel |
| Burst start | 2026-05-04 05:42:03 |
| Burst end | 2026-05-04 05:58:28 |
| Burst commits | 12 |
| Burst window minutes | 90 |
| Tenure days | 664 |
| Distinct messages | 3 |
| Avg message length | 20 |
| Top message | adding updated files |
| Top message count | 10 |
| Prt revert | — |
| Explanation | Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days. |
{
"slug": "wp-travel",
"author_slug": "wptravel",
"burst_start": "2026-05-04 05:42:03",
"burst_end": "2026-05-04 05:58:28",
"burst_commits": 12,
"burst_window_minutes": 90,
"tenure_days": 664,
"distinct_messages": 3,
"avg_message_length": 19.7,
"top_message": "adding updated files",
"top_message_count": 10,
"prt_revert": null,
"explanation": "Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days."
}| Slug | tm-wordpress-redirection |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 10 |
{
"slug": "tm-wordpress-redirection",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 10
}| Slug | udimi-optin |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 30 |
{
"slug": "udimi-optin",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 30
}| Slug | revoty |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "revoty",
"new_contributors": [
"wpcenter"
],
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | raptor-global-addons-upsells-rules |
|---|---|
| New contributors | |
| Active installs | 0 |
{
"slug": "raptor-global-addons-upsells-rules",
"new_contributors": [
"freemius"
],
"active_installs": 0
}| Slug | woo-commerce-min-weight |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 20 |
{
"slug": "woo-commerce-min-weight",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 20
}| Slug | zawgyi-embed |
|---|---|
| Closed reason | — |
| Closed date | 2026-05-06 00:00:00 |
| Active installs | 20 |
{
"slug": "zawgyi-embed",
"closed_reason": "",
"closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
"active_installs": 20
}