Events

5,700 events . · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Low plugin_closed iNET Webkit (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluginet-webkit
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-08 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "inet-webkit",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed WP Magnific Popup (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-magnific-popup
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-07 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-magnific-popup",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed GD Security Headers (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggd-security-headers
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-08 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "gd-security-headers",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-08 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed Docs Viewer Add-On for WP Job Openings (6k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugdocs-viewer-add-on-for-wp-job-openings
Closed reasonauthor-request
Closed date2026-05-07 00:00:00
Active installs6,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "docs-viewer-add-on-for-wp-job-openings",
    "closed_reason": "author-request",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 6000
}
Low plugin_closed reCAPTCHA for Asgaros Forum (4k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugrecaptcha-for-asgaros-forum
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-07 00:00:00
Active installs5,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "recaptcha-for-asgaros-forum",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-07 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 5000
}
Medium release_after_dormancy Smart Grid-Layout Design for Contact Form 7 (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugcf7-grid-layout
Previous version4.15.8
Current version4.16.0
Dormancy days694
Active installs10,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "cf7-grid-layout",
    "previous_version": "4.15.8",
    "current_version": "4.16.0",
    "dormancy_days": 694,
    "active_installs": 10000
}
Medium release_after_dormancy Automatic Domain Changer (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugautomatic-domain-changer
Previous version2.0.4
Current version3.0.1
Dormancy days388
Active installs10,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "automatic-domain-changer",
    "previous_version": "2.0.4",
    "current_version": "3.0.1",
    "dormancy_days": 388,
    "active_installs": 10000
}
High compromised_committer_burst WP-Appbox (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-appbox
Author slugmarcelismus
Burst start2026-04-26 19:15:18
Burst end2026-04-26 19:18:43
Burst commits12
Burst window minutes90
Tenure days1,439
Distinct messages1
Avg message length7
Top messagev4.5.12
Top message count12
Prt revert—
ExplanationEstablished author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-appbox",
    "author_slug": "marcelismus",
    "burst_start": "2026-04-26 19:15:18",
    "burst_end": "2026-04-26 19:18:43",
    "burst_commits": 12,
    "burst_window_minutes": 90,
    "tenure_days": 1439,
    "distinct_messages": 1,
    "avg_message_length": 7,
    "top_message": "v4.5.12",
    "top_message_count": 12,
    "prt_revert": null,
    "explanation": "Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days."
}
High closed_plugin_resurrection Zalomení (6k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugzalomeni
Previously closed reasonsecurity-issue
Author slugvyskoczilova
Current version2.0.0
Active installs7,000
ExplanationPlugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "zalomeni",
    "previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
    "author_slug": "vyskoczilova",
    "current_version": "2.0.0",
    "active_installs": 7000,
    "explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}
High closed_plugin_resurrection Super Testimonials (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsola-testimonials
Previously closed reasonsecurity-issue
Author slugsolaplugins
Current version3.0.1
Active installs300
ExplanationPlugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sola-testimonials",
    "previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
    "author_slug": "solaplugins",
    "current_version": "3.0.1",
    "active_installs": 300,
    "explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}
High closed_plugin_resurrection Super Testimonials (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsola-testimonials
Previously closed reasonsecurity-issue
Author slugsolaplugins
Current version3.0.1
Active installs300
ExplanationPlugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sola-testimonials",
    "previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
    "author_slug": "solaplugins",
    "current_version": "3.0.1",
    "active_installs": 300,
    "explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}
Critical bulk_changelog_reuse Resolved 6mo ago
Author slugsmallplugins
Changelog line* Dev: Update freemius SDK and maintenance update.
Plugin count3
Plugin slugsquery-loop-post-selector exclude-link-suggestions automatic-block-inserter
Versions1.0.6 1.0.9 1.0.2
Window start2026-04-27 15:42:18
Window end2026-04-29 16:10:43
Total installs600
Recent committer joins1
ExplanationSame changelog first-line reused across ≥3 plugins within 14 days by a committer who recently (<12 months) became attached to at least one of them. Decoy-commit campaign pattern — the Essential Plugin incident used a single "Check compatibility with WordPress version 6.8.2" line across 31 plugins to disguise the initial malicious push.
View raw JSON
{
    "author_slug": "smallplugins",
    "changelog_line": "* Dev: Update freemius SDK and maintenance update.",
    "plugin_count": 3,
    "plugin_slugs": [
        "query-loop-post-selector",
        "exclude-link-suggestions",
        "automatic-block-inserter"
    ],
    "versions": [
        "1.0.6",
        "1.0.9",
        "1.0.2"
    ],
    "window_start": "2026-04-27 15:42:18",
    "window_end": "2026-04-29 16:10:43",
    "total_installs": 600,
    "recent_committer_joins": 1,
    "explanation": "Same changelog first-line reused across \u22653 plugins within 14 days by a committer who recently (<12 months) became attached to at least one of them. Decoy-commit campaign pattern \u2014 the Essential Plugin incident used a single \"Check compatibility with WordPress version 6.8.2\" line across 31 plugins to disguise the initial malicious push."
}
Critical code_pattern Epeken for Anteraja (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluganteraja
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
epeken-anteraja.php
Line
86
Snippet
$server = 'http://103.252.101.131';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "anteraja",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "epeken-anteraja.php",
        "line": 86,
        "snippet": "$server = 'http://103.252.101.131';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern DPD in Russia – Shipping for WooCommerce (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-dpd
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/dpd-sdk/src/lib/API/Service/TrackingOrder.php
Line
13
Snippet
const TEST_API_URL = 'http://91.209.80.50:9090/ordertracking ';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-dpd",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/dpd-sdk/src/lib/API/Service/TrackingOrder.php",
        "line": 13,
        "snippet": "const TEST_API_URL = 'http://91.209.80.50:9090/ordertracking ';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Speedaf Express for woocommerce (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugspeedaf-express-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.3
Hit count2
First hit
File
sdk/Configuration.php
Line
8
Snippet
'base_path' => API_DEBUG ? 'http://8.214.27.92:8480/' : 'https://apis.speedaf.com/', // kinldy replace this with the LIVE PATH like 'api.speedaf.com'
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "speedaf-express-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.3",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "sdk/Configuration.php",
        "line": 8,
        "snippet": "'base_path' => API_DEBUG ? 'http://8.214.27.92:8480/' : 'https://apis.speedaf.com/', // kinldy replace this with the LIVE PATH like 'api.speedaf.com'"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern KnowledgeBase with AI ChatBot HelpDesk – KBx (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugknowledgebase-helpdesk
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.7.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php
Line
189
Snippet
L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "knowledgebase-helpdesk",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.7.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 189,
        "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern MoceanAPI Order SMS Notification for WooCommerce (50 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmoceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.12
Hit count3
First hit
File
lib/MoceanSMS.php
Line
24
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moceansms-order-sms-notification-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.12",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/MoceanSMS.php",
        "line": 24,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Joomla 1.5 Importer (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugjoomla-15-importer
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
joomla-15-importer.php
Line
177
Snippet
$db = new mysqli( $db_info[ 'hostname' ], $db_info[ 'username' ], $db_info[ 'password' ], $db_info[ 'database' ], $db_info[ 'port' ] );
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "joomla-15-importer",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "joomla-15-importer.php",
        "line": 177,
        "snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $db_info[ 'hostname' ], $db_info[ 'username' ], $db_info[ 'password' ], $db_info[ 'database' ], $db_info[ 'port' ] );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Payment gateway for WooCommerce – Woo Alipay (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-alipay
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php
Line
6
Snippet
return new mysqli($connConf["host"], $connConf["username"], $connConf["password"], $connConf["dbname"], $connConf["port"]);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-alipay",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/alipay/lotusphp_runtime/DB/Adapter/ConnectionAdapter/DbConnectionAdapterMysqli.php",
        "line": 6,
        "snippet": "return new mysqli($connConf[\"host\"], $connConf[\"username\"], $connConf[\"password\"], $connConf[\"dbname\"], $connConf[\"port\"]);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Medium code_pattern Is there a problem (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugis-there-a-problem
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
is-there-a-problem.php
Line
413
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapegithub_self_distro
Urlhttps://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem
Url hostgithub.com
Slug argis_there_a_problem
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "is-there-a-problem",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "is-there-a-problem.php",
        "line": 413,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "github_self_distro",
    "url": "https://github.com/martinfeuillet/Is-there-a-problem",
    "url_host": "github.com",
    "slug_arg": "is_there_a_problem"
}
Critical code_pattern Gravity Forms Campaign Fields Add-On (40 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggf-campaign-fields
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.1
Hit count38
First hit
File
lib/whichbrowser/parser/data/profiles.php
Line
600
Snippet
'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML' => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "gf-campaign-fields",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.1",
    "hit_count": 38,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/whichbrowser/parser/data/profiles.php",
        "line": 600,
        "snippet": "'http://112.74.195.169/upload/xmlfiles/STUDIO_X8_HD.XML'                                              => [ 'BLU', 'Studio X8 HD', 'Android', DeviceType::MOBILE ],"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern OTP Authenticator (30 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugotp-authenticator
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php
Line
36
Snippet
private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libraries/alibaba/alibabacloud/client/src/Credentials/Providers/EcsRamRoleProvider.php",
        "line": 36,
        "snippet": "private $uri = 'http://100.100.100.200/latest/meta-data/ram/security-credentials/';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – Events / Locations Slider (90 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstonehenge-em-slider
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.8.7
Hit count1
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stonehenge-em-slider",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.8.7",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern STN – Save To Nextcloud (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstn-save-to-nextcloud
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/CreateBDD.php
Line
30
Snippet
$mysqli = new mysqli($thisBDD['DB_HOST'], $thisBDD['DB_USER'], $thisBDD['DB_PASSWORD'], $thisBDD['DB_NAME']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stn-save-to-nextcloud",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/CreateBDD.php",
        "line": 30,
        "snippet": "$mysqli = new mysqli($thisBDD['DB_HOST'], $thisBDD['DB_USER'], $thisBDD['DB_PASSWORD'], $thisBDD['DB_NAME']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Bitcoin, Ethereum and ERC20 crypto wallets with exchange (70 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmulti-currency-wallet
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.1.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/etherscan-api.php
Line
78
Snippet
'action' => 'eth_call',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "multi-currency-wallet",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.1.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/etherscan-api.php",
        "line": 78,
        "snippet": "'action' => 'eth_call',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern AI Workflow Automation (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugai-workflow-automation-lite
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.4.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-wp-ai-workflows-analytics-collector.php
Line
5
Snippet
private $analytics_endpoint = 'https://wpaiworkflows.com/wp-json/wp-ai-workflows-analytics/v1/collect';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ai-workflow-automation-lite",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.4.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wp-ai-workflows-analytics-collector.php",
        "line": 5,
        "snippet": "private $analytics_endpoint = 'https://wpaiworkflows.com/wp-json/wp-ai-workflows-analytics/v1/collect';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern GoDAM – Video Hosting for LMS & Online Courses (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggodam
Pattern$analytics_endpoint
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.8.0
Hit count4
First hit
File
inc/classes/rest-api/class-analytics.php
Line
166
Snippet
$analytics_endpoint = RTGODAM_ANALYTICS_BASE . '/processed-analytics/fetch/';
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "godam",
    "pattern": "$analytics_endpoint",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.8.0",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/classes/rest-api/class-analytics.php",
        "line": 166,
        "snippet": "$analytics_endpoint = RTGODAM_ANALYTICS_BASE . '/processed-analytics/fetch/';"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern TNG WordPress Integration (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtng-wordpress-plugin
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version10.1.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
tng.php
Line
478
Snippet
update_user_meta($wp_id, 'wp_capabilities', 'a:1:{s:13:"administrator";b:1;}');
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tng-wordpress-plugin",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "10.1.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "tng.php",
        "line": 478,
        "snippet": "update_user_meta($wp_id, 'wp_capabilities', 'a:1:{s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;}');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern JS Job Manager (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugjs-jobs
Patternsetup.joomsky.com
Kindioc:domain
Version2.0.2
Hit count5
First hit
File
includes/includer.php
Line
102
Snippet
define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "js-jobs",
    "pattern": "setup.joomsky.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/includer.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Email OTP Authenticator – Login, Register & 2FA (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugemail-otp-authenticator
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version6.4.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php
Line
259
Snippet
L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "email-otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.4.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php",
        "line": 259,
        "snippet": "L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Nomiddleman Bitcoin and Crypto Payments for WooCommerce (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/NMM_Blockchain.php
Line
1,357
Snippet
$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/NMM_Blockchain.php",
        "line": 1357,
        "snippet": "$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Online Payment for Bank Mellat (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbank-mellat
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.2
Hit count6
First hit
File
includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php
Line
40
Snippet
$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name .
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bank-mellat",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php",
        "line": 40,
        "snippet": "$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name ."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – Email Users (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugevents-manager-email-users
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "events-manager-email-users",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Abandoned Contact Form 7 (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugabandoned-contact-form-7
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/class.cf7af.update.php
Line
162
Snippet
L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params ); → L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "abandoned-contact-form-7",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/class.cf7af.update.php",
        "line": 162,
        "snippet": "L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Low code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Medium recent_prt_intervention Bolt CTA Button – Floating Call Button for WordPress (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbolt-cta-button
Active installs1,000
Is closedno
Prt committersplugin-master
First touch2026-04-23 10:33:46
Last touch2026-04-23 10:33:46
Commit count1
Commits sample
CommitterAtMessage
plugin-master2026-04-23 10:33:46Adding Bolt CTA Button by ismeteroglu.
Lookback days30
Explanationwp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bolt-cta-button",
    "active_installs": 1000,
    "is_closed": false,
    "prt_committers": [
        "plugin-master"
    ],
    "first_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
    "last_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
    "commit_count": 1,
    "commits_sample": [
        {
            "committer": "plugin-master",
            "at": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
            "message": "Adding Bolt CTA Button by ismeteroglu."
        }
    ],
    "lookback_days": 30,
    "explanation": "wp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident."
}
High compromised_committer_burst WP Travel – Ultimate Travel Booking System, Tour Management Engine (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-travel
Author slugwptravel
Burst start2026-05-04 05:42:03
Burst end2026-05-04 05:58:28
Burst commits12
Burst window minutes90
Tenure days664
Distinct messages3
Avg message length20
Top messageadding updated files
Top message count10
Prt revert—
ExplanationEstablished author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-travel",
    "author_slug": "wptravel",
    "burst_start": "2026-05-04 05:42:03",
    "burst_end": "2026-05-04 05:58:28",
    "burst_commits": 12,
    "burst_window_minutes": 90,
    "tenure_days": 664,
    "distinct_messages": 3,
    "avg_message_length": 19.7,
    "top_message": "adding updated files",
    "top_message_count": 10,
    "prt_revert": null,
    "explanation": "Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days."
}
Low plugin_closed Tm – WordPress Redirection (10 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtm-wordpress-redirection
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tm-wordpress-redirection",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 10
}
Low plugin_closed Udimi Tools (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugudimi-optin
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs30
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "udimi-optin",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 30
}
Low plugin_closed Woo Commerce Minimum Weight (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-commerce-min-weight
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-commerce-min-weight",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}
Low plugin_closed Zawgyi Embed (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugzawgyi-embed
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "zawgyi-embed",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}