Events

5,700 events . · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Medium plugin_closed Fancy Image Show (80 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfancy-image-show
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs80
Serial offender noteSeverity bumped low→medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fancy-image-show",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 80,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped low\u2192medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}
Medium contributor_added Fancy Image Show (80 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfancy-image-show
New contributorsgopi_plus
Active installs80
Serial offender noteSeverity bumped low→medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fancy-image-show",
    "new_contributors": [
        "gopi_plus"
    ],
    "active_installs": 80,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped low\u2192medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}
Low plugin_closed SP Blog Designer (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsp-blog-designer
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs60
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sp-blog-designer",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 60
}
Low plugin_closed Next Date (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnextdate
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nextdate",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Low plugin_closed NMR Strava activities (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnmr-strava-activities
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs80
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nmr-strava-activities",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 80
}
Low plugin_closed GoodMeet – Meetings & Classes for Google Meet (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggoodmeet
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "goodmeet",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Low plugin_closed Forms RB – Contact Form Builder & Custom Forms (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugforms-rb
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "forms-rb",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Critical code_pattern SaFly Curl Patch (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsafly-curl-patch
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
SaFly-Curl-Patch.php
Line
70
Snippet
$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "safly-curl-patch",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "SaFly-Curl-Patch.php",
        "line": 70,
        "snippet": "$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Country Caching For WP Super Cache (200 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version0.8.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
cc_wpsc_init.php
Line
17
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.8.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cc_wpsc_init.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache"
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternw.anadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count4
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "w.anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternanadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count6
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Category Country Aware WordPress (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcategory-country-aware
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
cca_init.php
Line
20
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json', __FILE__, 'category-country-aware');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcategory-country-aware
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "category-country-aware",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cca_init.php",
        "line": 20,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json',\t__FILE__,\t'category-country-aware');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "category-country-aware"
}
Low plugin_closed Shortcodely (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugshortcodely
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs400
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "shortcodely",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 400
}
Low plugin_closed Product Catalog (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtc-product-catalog
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs300
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tc-product-catalog",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 300
}
Critical code_pattern Skrill – WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugofficial-skrill-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.73
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php
Line
49
Snippet
protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "official-skrill-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.73",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Hero Posts Lite (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughero-posts-lite
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php
Line
79
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hero-posts-lite",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php",
        "line": 79,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Slugembedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php
Line
148
Snippet
L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); → L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "embedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 148,
        "snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Broadcast Live Video – Live Streaming : WebRTC, HLS, RTSP, RTMP (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugvideowhisper-live-streaming-integration
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version7.1.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/options.php
Line
424
Snippet
'appRoles' => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:"conferenceParticipantCamera";a:3:{s:5:"roles";s:30:"administrator,performer,client";s:5:"value";s:1:"1";s:5:"other";s:0:"";}s:8:"ba
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "videowhisper-live-streaming-integration",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.1.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/options.php",
        "line": 424,
        "snippet": "'appRoles'                        => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:\"conferenceParticipantCamera\";a:3:{s:5:\"roles\";s:30:\"administrator,performer,client\";s:5:\"value\";s:1:\"1\";s:5:\"other\";s:0:\"\";}s:8:\"ba"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Restaurant Price List (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-restaurant-price-list
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php
Line
204
Snippet
L196: $request = wp_remote_post( → L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-restaurant-price-list",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php",
        "line": 204,
        "snippet": "L196: $request = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Epeken All Kurir for Woocommerce (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugepeken-all-kurir
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.6
Hit count4
First hit
File
epeken_courier.php
Line
18
Snippet
$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server..
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "epeken-all-kurir",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.6",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "epeken_courier.php",
        "line": 18,
        "snippet": "$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server.."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Publitio (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpublitio
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/publitio_api.php
Line
125
Snippet
L114: $response = curl_exec($curl); → L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "publitio",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/publitio_api.php",
        "line": 125,
        "snippet": "L114: $response = curl_exec($curl);  \u2192  L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Multibanco / MB Way / Payshop (by LUSOPAY) for WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmultibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php
Line
456
Snippet
$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "multibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php",
        "line": 456,
        "snippet": "$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Opal Woo Custom Product Variation (300 installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugopal-woo-custom-product-variation
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.3.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php
Line
65
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json
Url hostsource.wpopal.com
Slug argopal-woo-custom-product-variation
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.3.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json",
    "url_host": "source.wpopal.com",
    "slug_arg": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation"
}
Critical code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – OpenStreetMaps (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstonehenge-em-osm
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.2.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stonehenge-em-osm",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.2.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Low code_pattern WP GoToWebinar (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-gotowebinar
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version15.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-gotowebinar.php
Line
1,179
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argwp-gotowebinar
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-gotowebinar",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "15.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-gotowebinar.php",
        "line": 1179,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "wp-gotowebinar"
}
Medium code_pattern Yoo Slider – Image Slider & Video Slider (500 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugyoo-slider
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
yoo-slider.php
Line
56
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yoo-slider",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "yoo-slider.php",
        "line": 56,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern Tussendoor – Open RDW (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugopen-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version5.3.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
app/Updater.php
Line
60
Snippet
self::$updater = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "open-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.3.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/Updater.php",
        "line": 60,
        "snippet": "self::$updater      = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Hitsteps Web Analytics (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughitsteps-visitor-manager
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.91
Hit count2
First hit
File
api.payload.php
Line
4
Snippet
$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1="http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hitsteps-visitor-manager",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.91",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "api.payload.php",
        "line": 4,
        "snippet": "$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1=\"http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low plugin_closed AI Copilot – Content Generator (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugai-copilot-content-generator
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ai-copilot-content-generator",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed Notification for Telegram (4k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnotification-for-telegram
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs4,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "notification-for-telegram",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 4000
}
Critical code_pattern Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnexter-extension
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.6.8
Hit count2
First hit
File
include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php
Line
779
Snippet
L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args); → L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nexter-extension",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.6.8",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php",
        "line": 779,
        "snippet": "L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args);  \u2192  L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Medium contributor_added Social Media Feather (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsocial-media-feather
New contributorssharethis
Active installs10,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "social-media-feather",
    "new_contributors": [
        "sharethis"
    ],
    "active_installs": 10000
}
Medium code_scan_delta Knit Pay – Cashfree, Instamojo, Razorpay, PayPal and more (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugknit-pay
Previous version9.3.3.0
Current version9.3.4.0
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
base64_decodebuiltingateways/SBIePay/AES128.php20$cipher_text = base64_decode( $cipher_text );medium
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "knit-pay",
    "previous_version": "9.3.3.0",
    "current_version": "9.3.4.0",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "base64_decode",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "gateways/SBIePay/AES128.php",
            "line": 20,
            "snippet": "$cipher_text = base64_decode( $cipher_text );",
            "confidence": "medium"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
High code_scan_delta Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnexter-extension
Previous version4.6.7
Current version4.6.8
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidenceDetails
remote_enqueuebuiltininclude/panel-settings/extensions/nexter-ext-adobe-font.php190wp_enqueue_style( 'nexter-adobe-typekit','https://use.typekit.net/'.esc_attr($font_val['project_id']).'.css', [], NEXTER_EXT_VER );medium
Url
https://use.typekit.net/
Url host
use.typekit.net
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltininclude/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php779L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args); → L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );high—
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltininclude/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php871L870: $body = wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response ); → L871: $plugin_info = @unserialize( $body );high—
New finding count3
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nexter-extension",
    "previous_version": "4.6.7",
    "current_version": "4.6.8",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "remote_enqueue",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "include/panel-settings/extensions/nexter-ext-adobe-font.php",
            "line": 190,
            "snippet": "wp_enqueue_style( 'nexter-adobe-typekit','https://use.typekit.net/'.esc_attr($font_val['project_id']).'.css', [], NEXTER_EXT_VER );",
            "confidence": "medium",
            "details": {
                "url": "https://use.typekit.net/",
                "url_host": "use.typekit.net"
            }
        },
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php",
            "line": 779,
            "snippet": "L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args);  \u2192  L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php",
            "line": 871,
            "snippet": "L870: $body = wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response );  \u2192  L871: $plugin_info = @unserialize( $body );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 3
}
Low contributor_added Admin Bar Visibility Control (10 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugdisable-admin-tool-bar
New contributorsekamran
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "disable-admin-tool-bar",
    "new_contributors": [
        "ekamran"
    ],
    "active_installs": 10
}
Low contributor_added The Innovative Form Builder – IvyForms (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugivyforms
New contributorsalexandergilmanov
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ivyforms",
    "new_contributors": [
        "alexandergilmanov"
    ],
    "active_installs": 100
}
Medium release_after_dormancy Asset CleanUp: Page Speed Booster (100k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-asset-clean-up
Previous version1.4.0.3
Current version1.4.0.4
Dormancy days419
Active installs100,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-asset-clean-up",
    "previous_version": "1.4.0.3",
    "current_version": "1.4.0.4",
    "dormancy_days": 419,
    "active_installs": 100000
}