FireEMS Stats

fireems-stats · by maltesesolutions · wordpress.org ↗ · SVN ↗
Active installs
10
Current version
4.0.1
Added
2015-11-26
Last updated
2020-09-10 (6y ago)
First seen by beacon
6mo ago
Total downloads
9,390

Alerts (1)

Low code_pattern 2026-10-19 15:36:21 (20h ago)
Slugfireems-stats
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
fireems-stats.php
Line
67
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttp://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json
Url hostupgrade.maltesesolutions.com
Slug argfireems-stats
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fireems-stats",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fireems-stats.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
    "url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
    "slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}
Show 1 resolved alert
Critical code_pattern Resolved · no_longer_matches 2026-10-06 14:58:42 (13d ago)
Slugfireems-stats
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
fireems-stats.php
Line
67
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json
Url hostupgrade.maltesesolutions.com
Slug argfireems-stats
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fireems-stats",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fireems-stats.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
    "url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
    "slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}
No SVN committer data yet for this plugin. Run wp beacon crawl-svn --slug=fireems-stats to populate.

Readme contributors (1)

Names the plugin's readme declares as contributors. A soft signal — anyone can be listed. The SVN access column is the ground-truth cross-reference: does this contributor actually commit code?

Contributor Member since SVN access Status
Mike 2015-11-23 — Active

Versions (6 most recent)

Release dates not yet populated — run wp beacon crawl-svn --slug=fireems-stats to fill them from svn ls /tags/.

Version Released Download
1.0.1 — zip
1.1.1 — zip
2.1.0 — zip
2.2.1 — zip
4.0.0 — zip
4.0.1 — zip