FV Player 8

{
    "slug": "fv-player",
    "previous_version": "8.1.7",
    "current_version": "8.1.8",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
            "line": 324,
            "snippet": "L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}

{
    "slug": "fv-player",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.1.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
        "line": 249,
        "snippet": "L239: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L249: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}