a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "operation-demo-importer",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "1.2.0",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "classes/importers/class-settings-importer.php",
"line": 44,
"snippet": "L28: $contents = curl_exec($ch); \u2192 L44: $data = @unserialize( $raw );"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
SVN committers (2)
Accounts with actual commit access to operation-demo-importer on plugins.svn.wordpress.org, reconstructed from svn log. This is the list that matters for ownership changes — not the readme contributors.
Names the plugin's readme declares as contributors. A soft signal — anyone can be listed. The SVN access column is the ground-truth cross-reference: does this contributor actually commit code?
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