WP Beacon
Critical code_pattern
Resolved · vendor_self_api_publitio
2026-05-08 09:56:54 (1mo ago)
| Slug | publitio |
|---|---|
| Pattern | unserialize_after_remote_call |
| Kind | builtin |
| Version | 2.2.6 |
| Hit count | 1 |
| First hit |
|
| Explanation | a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised. |
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "publitio",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.2.6",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "includes/publitio_api.php",
"line": 125,
"snippet": "L114: $response = curl_exec($curl); \u2192 L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}