a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "wp-reviews-plugin-for-google",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "13.2.9",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "trustindex-plugin.class.php",
"line": 7088,
"snippet": "L7078: $wpResponse = wp_remote_post( \u2192 L7088: $wpRepoResponse = unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($wpResponse));"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Accounts with actual commit access to wp-reviews-plugin-for-google on plugins.svn.wordpress.org, reconstructed from svn log. This is the list that matters for ownership changes — not the readme contributors.
Names the plugin's readme declares as contributors. A soft signal — anyone can be listed. The SVN access column is the ground-truth cross-reference: does this contributor actually commit code?