QuantumCloud

{
    "slug": "woowbot-woocommerce-chatbot",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.7.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/ai_integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 189,
        "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}

{
    "slug": "woowbot-woocommerce-chatbot",
    "previous_version": "4.6.1",
    "current_version": "4.7.6",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/ai_integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
            "line": 189,
            "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}

{
    "slug": "knowledgebase-helpdesk",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.7.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "kbx-wpbot/chatbot/includes/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 189,
        "snippet": "L184: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L189: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}

{
    "slug": "chatbot",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.2.4",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/integration/openai/plugin-upgrader/classes/plugin-upgrader.php",
        "line": 190,
        "snippet": "L185: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L190: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}