Dmitry V. (CEO of "UKR Solution")

{
    "slug": "barcode-scanner-lite-pos-to-manage-products-inventory-and-orders",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.12.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/features/updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 149,
        "snippet": "L146: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L149: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}

{
    "slug": "a4-barcode-generator",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.4.12",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 148,
        "snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}