a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
"slug": "embedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders",
"pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
"kind": "builtin",
"version": "2.0.5",
"hit_count": 1,
"first_hit": {
"file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
"line": 148,
"snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); \u2192 L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
},
"explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
SVN committers (2)
Accounts with actual commit access to embedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders on plugins.svn.wordpress.org, reconstructed from svn log. This is the list that matters for ownership changes — not the readme contributors.
Names the plugin's readme declares as contributors. A soft signal — anyone can be listed. The SVN access column is the ground-truth cross-reference: does this contributor actually commit code?