Events

868 events (filtered). · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_scan_delta Starter Sites & Templates by Neve (100k+ installs) 3d ago
Slugtemplates-patterns-collection
Previous version1.4.8
Current version1.4.9
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/TI_Beaver.php177L165: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) ); → L177: $response = @unserialize(high
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "templates-patterns-collection",
    "previous_version": "1.4.8",
    "current_version": "1.4.9",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/TI_Beaver.php",
            "line": 177,
            "snippet": "L165: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) );  \u2192  L177: $response = @unserialize(",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_scan_delta Trakoo – Orders Tracking for WooCommerce (10k+ installs) 8d ago
Slugwoo-orders-tracking
Previous version1.3.3
Current version1.3.4
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinincludes/class-vi-woo-orders-tracking-trackingmore.php331return vi_wot_json_decode( '[{"courier_name":"DHL Express","courier_code":"dhl","courier_type":"express","courier_phone":null,"country_code":"DE","courier_url":"http://www.dhl.com/en/express/trackihigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-orders-tracking",
    "previous_version": "1.3.3",
    "current_version": "1.3.4",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/class-vi-woo-orders-tracking-trackingmore.php",
            "line": 331,
            "snippet": "return vi_wot_json_decode( '[{\"courier_name\":\"DHL Express\",\"courier_code\":\"dhl\",\"courier_type\":\"express\",\"courier_phone\":null,\"country_code\":\"DE\",\"courier_url\":\"http://www.dhl.com/en/express/tracki",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_scan_delta Starter Sites & Templates by Neve (100k+ installs) 8d ago
Slugtemplates-patterns-collection
Previous version1.4.7
Current version1.4.8
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/TI_Beaver.php181L162: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) ); → L181: if ( @unserialize( $serialized_string ) !== true && preg_match( '/^[aOs]:/', $serializedhigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "templates-patterns-collection",
    "previous_version": "1.4.7",
    "current_version": "1.4.8",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/TI_Beaver.php",
            "line": 181,
            "snippet": "L162: $response = wp_remote_get( esc_url_raw( $url ) );  \u2192  L181: if ( @unserialize( $serialized_string ) !== true && preg_match( '/^[aOs]:/', $serialized",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_pattern Uncanny Automator – MCP Server + Automation MCP for Claude & ChatGPT (40k+ installs) Resolved 13d ago
Sluguncanny-automator
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version8.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/app/Presentation/Admin/Site_Registration_Status_Notice.php
Line
146
Snippet
'challenge_url' => 'https://203.0.113.7' . $path,
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "uncanny-automator",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/app/Presentation/Admin/Site_Registration_Status_Notice.php",
        "line": 146,
        "snippet": "'challenge_url' => 'https://203.0.113.7' . $path,"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_scan_delta Uncanny Automator – MCP Server + Automation MCP for Claude & ChatGPT (40k+ installs) Resolved 13d ago
Sluguncanny-automator
Previous version7.7.1
Current version8.0.0
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/app/Presentation/Admin/Site_Registration_Status_Notice.php146'challenge_url' => 'https://203.0.113.7' . $path,high
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "uncanny-automator",
    "previous_version": "7.7.1",
    "current_version": "8.0.0",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/app/Presentation/Admin/Site_Registration_Status_Notice.php",
            "line": 146,
            "snippet": "'challenge_url' => 'https://203.0.113.7' . $path,",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical bulk_committer_takeover Migrate Guru – Site Migration & Cloning (200k+ installs) Resolved 17d ago
Committerritesh.soni36
Member since2015-05-23
Plugins joined11
Spread days147
Earliest join2019-06-06 13:31:26
Latest join2019-11-01 11:34:54
Combined installs432,000
Sample plugins
SlugActive installsFirst commit at
migrate-guru200,0002019-06-06 13:31:26
malcare-security100,0002019-06-06 14:30:06
blogvault-real-time-backup80,0002019-06-06 14:00:44
wpremote30,0002019-11-01 11:34:54
bv-cloudways-automated-migration20,0002019-06-06 14:33:19
bv-pantheon-migration1,0002019-06-06 14:31:37
migrate-to-liquidweb1,0002019-06-06 13:58:21
bv-migration-to-wpserveur02019-06-06 14:09:36
migrate-to-wefoster02019-06-06 14:35:50
savvii-wp-migrate02019-06-06 14:34:30
View raw JSON
{
    "committer": "ritesh.soni36",
    "member_since": "2015-05-23",
    "plugins_joined": 11,
    "spread_days": 147,
    "earliest_join": "2019-06-06 13:31:26",
    "latest_join": "2019-11-01 11:34:54",
    "combined_installs": 432000,
    "sample_plugins": [
        {
            "slug": "migrate-guru",
            "active_installs": 200000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 13:31:26"
        },
        {
            "slug": "malcare-security",
            "active_installs": 100000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:30:06"
        },
        {
            "slug": "blogvault-real-time-backup",
            "active_installs": 80000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:00:44"
        },
        {
            "slug": "wpremote",
            "active_installs": 30000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-11-01 11:34:54"
        },
        {
            "slug": "bv-cloudways-automated-migration",
            "active_installs": 20000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:33:19"
        },
        {
            "slug": "bv-pantheon-migration",
            "active_installs": 1000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:31:37"
        },
        {
            "slug": "migrate-to-liquidweb",
            "active_installs": 1000,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 13:58:21"
        },
        {
            "slug": "bv-migration-to-wpserveur",
            "active_installs": 0,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:09:36"
        },
        {
            "slug": "migrate-to-wefoster",
            "active_installs": 0,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:35:50"
        },
        {
            "slug": "savvii-wp-migrate",
            "active_installs": 0,
            "first_commit_at": "2019-06-06 14:34:30"
        }
    ]
}
Critical code_scan_delta FV Flowplayer Video Player (10k+ installs) Resolved 19d ago
Slugfv-wordpress-flowplayer
Previous version7.5.55.7212
Current version7.5.56.7212
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/fp-api-private.php381L371: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); → L381: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\*[\s\S]*?\*/\s+~', '', $raw_responshigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fv-wordpress-flowplayer",
    "previous_version": "7.5.55.7212",
    "current_version": "7.5.56.7212",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
            "line": 381,
            "snippet": "L371: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L381: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_scan_delta افزونه پیامک ووکامرس | Persian WooCommerce SMS (50k+ installs) Resolved 27d ago
Slugpersian-woocommerce-sms
Previous version7.3.1
Current version7.3.2
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSPishgaman.php62$client = new nusoap_client( 'http://82.99.216.45/services/?wsdl', true );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/RazPayamak.php31$client = new SoapClient( "http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/HostIran.php33$client = new SoapClient( "http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/IranSMSCOM.php30$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.52.205/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/GamaPayamak.php32$client = new SoapClient( "http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ParsianSMS.php33$remote = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/NiazPardazCOM.php32$client = new SoapClient( "http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ParandSMS.php30$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/LoginPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/IdehPayam.php32$soap = new SoapClient( "http://185.112.33.61/webservice/send.php?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSBefrest.php32$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ChaparPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSMeli.php33$client = new SoapClient( "http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/MehrPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSMelli.php35$remote = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );high
New finding count16
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "persian-woocommerce-sms",
    "previous_version": "7.3.1",
    "current_version": "7.3.2",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSPishgaman.php",
            "line": 62,
            "snippet": "$client                   = new nusoap_client( 'http://82.99.216.45/services/?wsdl', true );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/RazPayamak.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/HostIran.php",
            "line": 33,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/IranSMSCOM.php",
            "line": 30,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.52.205/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/GamaPayamak.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ParsianSMS.php",
            "line": 33,
            "snippet": "$remote = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/NiazPardazCOM.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ParandSMS.php",
            "line": 30,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/LoginPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/IdehPayam.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$soap = new SoapClient( \"http://185.112.33.61/webservice/send.php?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSBefrest.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ChaparPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSMeli.php",
            "line": 33,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"http://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/MehrPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSMelli.php",
            "line": 35,
            "snippet": "$remote = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 16
}
Critical code_scan_delta FV Flowplayer Video Player (10k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfv-wordpress-flowplayer
Previous version7.5.55.7212
Current version7.5.55.7212
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/fp-api-private.php397L387: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); → L397: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\*[\s\S]*?\*/\s+~', '', $raw_responshigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fv-wordpress-flowplayer",
    "previous_version": "7.5.55.7212",
    "current_version": "7.5.55.7212",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
            "line": 397,
            "snippet": "L387: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L397: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_scan_delta افزونه پیامک ووکامرس | Persian WooCommerce SMS (50k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpersian-woocommerce-sms
Previous version7.3.1
Current version7.3.1
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/IdehPayam.php32$soap = new SoapClient( "https://185.112.33.61/webservice/send.php?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ChaparPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/RazPayamak.php31$client = new SoapClient( "https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/NiazPardazCOM.php32$client = new SoapClient( "https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/LoginPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/YektaTech.php32$client = new SoapClient( "https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ParsianSMS.php33$remote = wp_remote_get( 'https://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSMeli.php33$client = new SoapClient( "https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/MehrPanel.php31$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSPishgaman.php60$client = new SoapClient( 'https://82.99.216.45/services/?wsdl', true );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSMelli.php35$remote = wp_remote_get( 'https://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/GamaPayamak.php32$client = new SoapClient( "https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/ParandSMS.php30$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/SMSBefrest.php32$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
hardcoded_ip_urlbuiltinsrc/Gateways/IranSMSCOM.php30$client = new SoapClient( "https://87.107.52.205/post/send.asmx?wsdl" );high
New finding count16
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "persian-woocommerce-sms",
    "previous_version": "7.3.1",
    "current_version": "7.3.1",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/IdehPayam.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$soap = new SoapClient( \"https://185.112.33.61/webservice/send.php?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ChaparPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/RazPayamak.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/NiazPardazCOM.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/LoginPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/YektaTech.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ParsianSMS.php",
            "line": 33,
            "snippet": "$remote = wp_remote_get( 'https://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSMeli.php",
            "line": 33,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/MehrPanel.php",
            "line": 31,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSPishgaman.php",
            "line": 60,
            "snippet": "$client                   = new SoapClient( 'https://82.99.216.45/services/?wsdl', true );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSMelli.php",
            "line": 35,
            "snippet": "$remote = wp_remote_get( 'https://185.4.31.182/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?' . $content );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/GamaPayamak.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://37.228.138.118/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/ParandSMS.php",
            "line": 30,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/SMSBefrest.php",
            "line": 32,
            "snippet": "$client = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "src/Gateways/IranSMSCOM.php",
            "line": 30,
            "snippet": "$client       = new SoapClient( \"https://87.107.52.205/post/send.asmx?wsdl\" );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 16
}
Critical code_scan_delta Jetpack VaultPress (10k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugvaultpress
Previous version4.0.7
Current version5.0.0
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinvaultpress.php1,525L1521: $r = wp_remote_get( $url=sprintf( "%s://%s/%s?cidr_ranges=1", $protocol, $hostname, $pa → L1525: $data = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $r ) );high
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "vaultpress",
    "previous_version": "4.0.7",
    "current_version": "5.0.0",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "vaultpress.php",
            "line": 1525,
            "snippet": "L1521: $r = wp_remote_get( $url=sprintf( \"%s://%s/%s?cidr_ranges=1\", $protocol, $hostname, $pa  \u2192  L1525: $data = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $r ) );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_pattern VERIFIED Crypto Checkout – Card to USDC WooCommerce Payment Gateway (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugverified-crypto-checkout
Patterneth_getCode
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.56.55
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php
Line
810
Snippet
array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "verified-crypto-checkout",
    "pattern": "eth_getCode",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.56.55",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
        "line": 810,
        "snippet": "array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern VERIFIED Crypto Checkout – Card to USDC WooCommerce Payment Gateway (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugverified-crypto-checkout
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.56.55
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php
Line
815
Snippet
$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "verified-crypto-checkout",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.56.55",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
        "line": 815,
        "snippet": "$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_scan_delta VERIFIED Crypto Checkout – Card to USDC WooCommerce Payment Gateway (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugverified-crypto-checkout
Previous version1.56.53
Current version1.56.55
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
eth_getCodeioc:code_patternincludes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php810array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),high
eth_callioc:code_patternincludes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php815$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );high
New finding count2
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "verified-crypto-checkout",
    "previous_version": "1.56.53",
    "current_version": "1.56.55",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "eth_getCode",
            "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
            "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
            "line": 810,
            "snippet": "array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "eth_call",
            "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
            "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
            "line": 815,
            "snippet": "$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 2
}
Critical code_scan_delta FV Player 8 (1k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfv-player
Previous version8.1.7
Current version8.1.8
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/fp-api-private.php324L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); → L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\*[\s\S]*?\*/\s+~', '', $raw_responshigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fv-player",
    "previous_version": "8.1.7",
    "current_version": "8.1.8",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
            "line": 324,
            "snippet": "L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Critical code_pattern FireEMS Stats (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfireems-stats
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
fireems-stats.php
Line
67
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json
Url hostupgrade.maltesesolutions.com
Slug argfireems-stats
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fireems-stats",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fireems-stats.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
    "url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
    "slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}
Critical code_pattern Xmas Widget Little Elf (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugxmas-widget
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
xmas-widget.php
Line
333
Snippet
L320: $request = wp_remote_get( → L333: $data = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "xmas-widget",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "xmas-widget.php",
        "line": 333,
        "snippet": "L320: $request = wp_remote_get(  \u2192  L333: $data = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern MyPress (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmy-press
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.01
Hit count1
First hit
File
mypress.php
Line
106
Snippet
$db = new mysqli( $config['database']['hostname'], $config['database']['username'], $config['database']['password'], $config['database']['database'] );
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "my-press",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.01",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "mypress.php",
        "line": 106,
        "snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $config['database']['hostname'], $config['database']['username'], $config['database']['password'], $config['database']['database'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern تایید اعتبار پیامکی (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsms-verification-pars
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
gateways.php
Line
88
Snippet
$baseurl = "http://37.130.202.188/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sms-verification-pars",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "gateways.php",
        "line": 88,
        "snippet": "$baseurl = \"http://37.130.202.188/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Simply Documents (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsimply-documents
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "simply-documents",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Corona Test Results (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcorona-test-results
Patterndecode_write_dropper
Kindbuiltin
Version1.11.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
corona-test-results-admin-settings.php
Line
1,198
Snippet
define( \'CTR_ENCRYPTION_KEY\', base64_decode( \'' . base64_encode( DataEncryption::getRandomKey() ) . '\' ) );';
Explanationa runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path — the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "corona-test-results",
    "pattern": "decode_write_dropper",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.11.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "corona-test-results-admin-settings.php",
        "line": 1198,
        "snippet": "define( \\'CTR_ENCRYPTION_KEY\\', base64_decode( \\'' . base64_encode( DataEncryption::getRandomKey() ) . '\\' ) );';"
    },
    "explanation": "a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path \u2014 the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote."
}
Critical code_pattern Schedule Tweets – TweetBoost Free (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugtweetboost
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/plugins/acf/includes/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tweetboost",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/plugins/acf/includes/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Mercado Lite — Multi-Vendor Marketplace for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmercado
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version2.3.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
public/rtwmer-class-mercado-public.php
Line
1,629
Snippet
$conn = new mysqli($rtwmer_sql_details['host'],$rtwmer_sql_details['user'],$rtwmer_sql_details['pass'],$rtwmer_sql_details['db']);// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.RestrictedClasses.mysql__mysqli
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mercado",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.3.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "public/rtwmer-class-mercado-public.php",
        "line": 1629,
        "snippet": "$conn = new mysqli($rtwmer_sql_details['host'],$rtwmer_sql_details['user'],$rtwmer_sql_details['pass'],$rtwmer_sql_details['db']);// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.RestrictedClasses.mysql__mysqli"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern SCD – Smart Currency Detector – Premium Variant for WCFM (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugscd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-wcfm
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
scd_update_checker_wcfm.php
Line
12
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/
Url hostbitbucket.org
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "scd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-wcfm",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "scd_update_checker_wcfm.php",
        "line": 12,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/",
    "url_host": "bitbucket.org",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Top Ten Lists (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugtop-ten-lists
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "top-ten-lists",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern Msg91 for WooCommerce (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmsg91-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
config/constants.php
Line
843
Snippet
- If ANY image is missing, empty, http (not https), or hosted on a bare IP address (e.g. `https://35.154.223.210/...`) / `localhost`, do NOT use a carousel. Instead send a NUMBERED TEXT LIST (no image
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "msg91-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "config/constants.php",
        "line": 843,
        "snippet": "- If ANY image is missing, empty, http (not https), or hosted on a bare IP address (e.g. `https://35.154.223.210/...`) / `localhost`, do NOT use a carousel. Instead send a NUMBERED TEXT LIST (no image"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Property Hive (3k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpropertyhive
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-ph-licenses.php
Line
531
Snippet
L525: if ( 200 !== wp_remote_retrieve_response_code( $request ) || '' === wp_remote_retrieve_b → L531: $body = @unserialize($request['body'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "propertyhive",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-ph-licenses.php",
        "line": 531,
        "snippet": "L525: if ( 200 !== wp_remote_retrieve_response_code( $request ) || '' === wp_remote_retrieve_b  \u2192  L531: $body = @unserialize($request['body'], ['allowed_classes' => false]);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Wise Chat (4k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwise-chat
PatterngetWPUsers
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version3.4.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
src/DAO/User/UsersDAO.php
Line
509
Snippet
public function getWPUsers($parameters) {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wise-chat",
    "pattern": "getWPUsers",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "3.4.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/DAO/User/UsersDAO.php",
        "line": 509,
        "snippet": "public function getWPUsers($parameters) {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Backvera (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugbackvera
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.9
Hit count4
First hit
File
includes/class-backvera-doh.php
Line
79
Snippet
array('url' => 'https://1.1.1.1/dns-query?type=A&name=' . $name, 'type' => 1),
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "backvera",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.9",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-backvera-doh.php",
        "line": 79,
        "snippet": "array('url' => 'https://1.1.1.1/dns-query?type=A&name=' . $name,    'type' => 1),"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Forvault Security (40 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugforvault-security
Patterneth_call
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.0.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/class-armoryf-shell-scanner.php
Line
273
Snippet
'label' => 'blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call literal (smart-contract C2 resolver)',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "forvault-security",
    "pattern": "eth_call",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-armoryf-shell-scanner.php",
        "line": 273,
        "snippet": "'label'  => 'blockchain JSON-RPC eth_call literal (smart-contract C2 resolver)',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Chavosh Affiliate (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugyektanet-affiliate
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
yektanet-affiliate.php
Line
242
Snippet
$request_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yektanet-affiliate",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "yektanet-affiliate.php",
        "line": 242,
        "snippet": "$request_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern wp-idados-crud (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwp-idados-crud
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version0.0.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/idados_functions.php
Line
423
Snippet
$mysqli = new mysqli($tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_host'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_user'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_pass'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_name']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-idados-crud",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.0.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/idados_functions.php",
        "line": 423,
        "snippet": "$mysqli = new mysqli($tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_host'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_user'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_pass'], $tb['rows'][0]['i0007_db_name']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern USMS-GH WooCommerce SMS Notification (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugusmsgh-wc-sms-notification
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.0
Hit count4
First hit
File
trunk/lib/UsmsGH.php
Line
23
Snippet
public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "usmsgh-wc-sms-notification",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.0",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "trunk/lib/UsmsGH.php",
        "line": 23,
        "snippet": "public $rest_ip_address = 'https://183.81.161.84:443/rest/2';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Stripe Frontend Registration (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugstripe-frontend-registration
Patterndirect_user_insert
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
registration_stripe_form.php
Line
133
Snippet
$insertquery='insert into wp_users (user_login,user_pass,user_nicename,user_email,user_url,user_registered,user_activation_key,user_status,display_name)
Explanationplugin issues a SQL `INSERT INTO ...users (user_login, user_pass, ...)` — bypassing `wp_create_user()`/`wp_insert_user()` to add an account with attacker-controlled credentials. Combined with `serialized_admin_role` this is the textbook hidden-administrator persistence used by the June 2024 credential-stuffing wave.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stripe-frontend-registration",
    "pattern": "direct_user_insert",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "registration_stripe_form.php",
        "line": 133,
        "snippet": "$insertquery='insert into wp_users (user_login,user_pass,user_nicename,user_email,user_url,user_registered,user_activation_key,user_status,display_name)"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin issues a SQL `INSERT INTO ...users (user_login, user_pass, ...)` \u2014 bypassing `wp_create_user()`/`wp_insert_user()` to add an account with attacker-controlled credentials. Combined with `serialized_admin_role` this is the textbook hidden-administrator persistence used by the June 2024 credential-stuffing wave."
}
Critical code_pattern SCM – Smart Currency Manager – Premium Variant for Dokan (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugscd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-dokan
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
scd_update_checker_dokan.php
Line
12
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/
Url hostbitbucket.org
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "scd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-dokan",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "scd_update_checker_dokan.php",
        "line": 12,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/",
    "url_host": "bitbucket.org",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Radio Islam Indonesia (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugradio-islam-indonesia
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version3.15.2015
Hit count5
First hit
File
radio-islam-indonesia.php
Line
217
Snippet
mp3:\"http://119.82.232.92/;stream.mp3\"
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "radio-islam-indonesia",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.15.2015",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "radio-islam-indonesia.php",
        "line": 217,
        "snippet": "mp3:\\\"http://119.82.232.92/;stream.mp3\\\""
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern mind-body (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmind-body-api-integration
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mind-body-api-integration",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Critical code_pattern tags.mowster (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmowster-tags
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.71
Hit count1
First hit
File
functions.php
Line
58
Snippet
L54: $request = wp_remote_post('http://wordpress.mowster.net/'.$action, $args); → L58: $response = @unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($request));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mowster-tags",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.71",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "functions.php",
        "line": 58,
        "snippet": "L54: $request = wp_remote_post('http://wordpress.mowster.net/'.$action, $args);  \u2192  L58: $response = @unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($request));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern NFT Login (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugnft-login
Patterneth_getCode
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.2.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-nft-login-util.php
Line
41
Snippet
'method' => 'eth_getCode',
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nft-login",
    "pattern": "eth_getCode",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.2.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-nft-login-util.php",
        "line": 41,
        "snippet": "'method' => 'eth_getCode',"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Jay Access Flickr (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjay-access-flickr
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.6
Hit count10
First hit
File
jay_access_flickr.php
Line
26
Snippet
"<img$1src=\"http://68.142.214.43/$2\"$3>",
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "jay-access-flickr",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.6",
    "hit_count": 10,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "jay_access_flickr.php",
        "line": 26,
        "snippet": "\"<img$1src=\\\"http://68.142.214.43/$2\\\"$3>\","
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern JournalAi (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjournalai
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count3
First hit
File
journalai.php
Line
27
Snippet
'http://100.20.92.101',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "journalai",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "journalai.php",
        "line": 27,
        "snippet": "'http://100.20.92.101',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Custom Blocks Templates (20 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcustom-blocks-templates
Patternfilter_the_content_in_the_main_loop
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.3.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
lib/block-templates.php
Line
32
Snippet
add_filter( 'the_content', __NAMESPACE__ . '\filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop' );
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "custom-blocks-templates",
    "pattern": "filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.3.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/block-templates.php",
        "line": 32,
        "snippet": "add_filter( 'the_content',  __NAMESPACE__ . '\\filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop' );"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Church Options (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugchurch-options
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "church-options",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern ABDUL Widget (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugabdul-wp-plugin
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version0.1.3.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
abdulapi/ABDUL.php
Line
20
Snippet
$eventclient = new nusoap_client('http://203.185.132.242/agent/ABDULChatter/wsdl/ABDUL.wsdl', 'wsdl',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "abdul-wp-plugin",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.1.3.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "abdulapi/ABDUL.php",
        "line": 20,
        "snippet": "$eventclient = new nusoap_client('http://203.185.132.242/agent/ABDULChatter/wsdl/ABDUL.wsdl', 'wsdl',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern CityCourier – Local Courier Booking & Tracking System (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcitycourier-local-courier-booking-tracking-system
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
admin/settings-page.php
Line
114
Snippet
'https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace', // CF; Date başlığı var
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "citycourier-local-courier-booking-tracking-system",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "admin/settings-page.php",
        "line": 114,
        "snippet": "'https://1.1.1.1/cdn-cgi/trace',       // CF; Date ba\u015fl\u0131\u011f\u0131 var"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Moredeal – Monetize your WordPress content (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmoredeal
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.25
Hit count1
First hit
File
application/libs/MoredealRestClient.php
Line
271
Snippet
L251: $error_mess .= ' Server replay: ' . \wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response ); → L271: $res = @unserialize( $response );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "moredeal",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.25",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "application/libs/MoredealRestClient.php",
        "line": 271,
        "snippet": "L251: $error_mess       .= ' Server replay: ' . \\wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response );  \u2192  L271: $res = @unserialize( $response );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern QuickTasker (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugquicktasker
PatterngetWPUsers
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.59.1
Hit count7
First hit
File
php/repositories/UserRepository.php
Line
169
Snippet
$wpUsersData = $this->getWPUsers(['include' => $wpUserIds]);
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "quicktasker",
    "pattern": "getWPUsers",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.59.1",
    "hit_count": 7,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "php/repositories/UserRepository.php",
        "line": 169,
        "snippet": "$wpUsersData = $this->getWPUsers(['include' => $wpUserIds]);"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Zerys Writer Marketplace (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugzerys-writer-marketplace
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count5
First hit
File
place-order.php
Line
9
Snippet
$menu_url = 'http://64.34.208.101/Json/GetMenu/'.$key[0]->apikay.'/'.$_SESSION['cidd'].'/'.$_SESSION['cUserId'];
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "zerys-writer-marketplace",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "place-order.php",
        "line": 9,
        "snippet": "$menu_url =  'http://64.34.208.101/Json/GetMenu/'.$key[0]->apikay.'/'.$_SESSION['cidd'].'/'.$_SESSION['cUserId'];"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern The Loyalty Box – WooCommerce Rewards Program (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugthe-loyalty-box-woocommerce-rewards-program
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.3
Hit count2
First hit
File
trunk/includes/loyaltybox.inc.php
Line
65
Snippet
public static $stateAPIendpoint = "http://54.85.223.200/api/v1/";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "the-loyalty-box-woocommerce-rewards-program",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.3",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "trunk/includes/loyaltybox.inc.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "public static $stateAPIendpoint = \"http://54.85.223.200/api/v1/\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Dropshix (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugdropshipping-xox
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.14
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-dropshipping-xox-autoupdate.php
Line
136
Snippet
L132: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L136: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "dropshipping-xox",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.14",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-dropshipping-xox-autoupdate.php",
        "line": 136,
        "snippet": "L132: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L136: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}