Events

5,700 events . · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Low contributor_added Force Update Translations (1k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugforce-update-translations
New contributorshiroshisato
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "force-update-translations",
    "new_contributors": [
        "hiroshisato"
    ],
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed Praison AI SEO (1k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugseo-wordpress
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-10-05 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "seo-wordpress",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed Cooked – Recipe Management (3k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcooked
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-10-05 00:00:00
Active installs3,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "cooked",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-05 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 3000
}
Medium code_scan_delta Nexura Security — Malware Scanner, Firewall, 2FA & WordPress Security (30 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugnexura-security
Previous version1.0.20
Current version1.0.22
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
eval_callbuiltinincludes/reinfection/class-db-persistence-analyzer.php41$suspicious_keywords = [ 'base64_decode', 'eval(', 'system(', 'shell_exec(', 'passthru(', 'assert(' ];medium
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nexura-security",
    "previous_version": "1.0.20",
    "current_version": "1.0.22",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "eval_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/reinfection/class-db-persistence-analyzer.php",
            "line": 41,
            "snippet": "$suspicious_keywords = [ 'base64_decode', 'eval(', 'system(', 'shell_exec(', 'passthru(', 'assert(' ];",
            "confidence": "medium"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Medium code_scan_delta ProRank SEO (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugprorank-seo
Previous version1.6.3
Current version1.6.4
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
base64_decodebuiltinincludes/Core/IntegrationSecrets.php37$bytes = base64_decode(substr($value, strlen(self::PREFIX)), true);medium
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "prorank-seo",
    "previous_version": "1.6.3",
    "current_version": "1.6.4",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "base64_decode",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/Core/IntegrationSecrets.php",
            "line": 37,
            "snippet": "$bytes = base64_decode(substr($value, strlen(self::PREFIX)), true);",
            "confidence": "medium"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Slugformglut
Previous version1.2.0
Current version1.4.0
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidenceDetails
remote_enqueuebuiltinincludes/class-formglut-shortcode.php779wp_enqueue_script( 'formglut-stripe-js', 'https://js.stripe.com/v3/', array(), null, true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.EnqueuedResourceParameters.MissingVersion -- Stripe requires the unversionmedium
Url
https://js.stripe.com/v3/
Url host
js.stripe.com
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "formglut",
    "previous_version": "1.2.0",
    "current_version": "1.4.0",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "remote_enqueue",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/class-formglut-shortcode.php",
            "line": 779,
            "snippet": "wp_enqueue_script( 'formglut-stripe-js', 'https://js.stripe.com/v3/', array(), null, true ); // phpcs:ignore WordPress.WP.EnqueuedResourceParameters.MissingVersion -- Stripe requires the unversion",
            "confidence": "medium",
            "details": {
                "url": "https://js.stripe.com/v3/",
                "url_host": "js.stripe.com"
            }
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Medium code_scan_delta LLMs.txt Curator (200 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugllms-txt-curator
Previous version2.0.0
Current version2.2.0
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
base64_decodebuiltinincludes/class-llms-txt-publication.php309$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- seemedium
gzinflatebuiltinincludes/class-llms-txt-publication.php309$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- seemedium
New finding count2
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "llms-txt-curator",
    "previous_version": "2.0.0",
    "current_version": "2.2.0",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "base64_decode",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/class-llms-txt-publication.php",
            "line": 309,
            "snippet": "$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- see",
            "confidence": "medium"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "gzinflate",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/class-llms-txt-publication.php",
            "line": 309,
            "snippet": "$data = function_exists( 'gzinflate' ) ? gzinflate( (string) base64_decode( $data, true ) ) : false; // phpcs:ignore WordPress.PHP.DiscouragedPHPFunctions.obfuscation_base64_decode -- see",
            "confidence": "medium"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 2
}
Critical code_scan_delta VERIFIED Crypto Checkout – Card to USDC WooCommerce Payment Gateway (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugverified-crypto-checkout
Previous version1.56.53
Current version1.56.55
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
eth_getCodeioc:code_patternincludes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php810array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),high
eth_callioc:code_patternincludes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php815$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );high
New finding count2
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "verified-crypto-checkout",
    "previous_version": "1.56.53",
    "current_version": "1.56.55",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "eth_getCode",
            "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
            "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
            "line": 810,
            "snippet": "array( 'eth_getCode', array( $wallet, 'latest' ) ),",
            "confidence": "high"
        },
        {
            "pattern": "eth_call",
            "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
            "file": "includes/missed-webhook/class-vccp-missed-webhook.php",
            "line": 815,
            "snippet": "$calls[] = array( 'eth_call', array( array( 'to' => $contract, 'data' => '0x70a08231' . str_repeat( '0', 24 ) . substr( $wallet, 2 ) ), 'latest' ) );",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 2
}
Critical code_scan_delta FV Player 8 (1k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfv-player
Previous version8.1.7
Current version8.1.8
New findings
PatternKindFileLineSnippetConfidence
unserialize_after_remote_callbuiltinincludes/fp-api-private.php324L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); → L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\*[\s\S]*?\*/\s+~', '', $raw_responshigh
New finding count1
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fv-player",
    "previous_version": "8.1.7",
    "current_version": "8.1.8",
    "new_findings": [
        {
            "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
            "kind": "builtin",
            "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
            "line": 324,
            "snippet": "L314: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L324: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons",
            "confidence": "high"
        }
    ],
    "new_finding_count": 1
}
Low contributor_added BeautyForms Form Builder (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugbeautyforms-form-builder
New contributorskawsarahmedr
Active installs0
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "beautyforms-form-builder",
    "new_contributors": [
        "kawsarahmedr"
    ],
    "active_installs": 0
}
High closed_plugin_resurrection Scheduling Plugin – Online Booking for WordPress (500 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcalendar-booking
Previously closed reasonsecurity-issue
Author slugstartbooking
Current version3.5.18
Active installs500
ExplanationPlugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue — verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "calendar-booking",
    "previously_closed_reason": "security-issue",
    "author_slug": "startbooking",
    "current_version": "3.5.18",
    "active_installs": 500,
    "explanation": "Plugin was previously closed by wp.org for a security issue and has now been reopened. Reopens of security-closed plugins are rare and typically indicate the original author fixed the issue \u2014 verify the current committer set matches the pre-closure state, and diff the current trunk against the pre-closure version to confirm no new payload was introduced."
}
Low contributor_added Socialhero Promotions (— installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsocialhero-promotions
New contributorsjuanpablosh
Active installs0
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "socialhero-promotions",
    "new_contributors": [
        "juanpablosh"
    ],
    "active_installs": 0
}
Low contributor_added Billie for WooCommerce (20 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugbillie-for-woocommerce
New contributorsbilliegmbh
Active installs30
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "billie-for-woocommerce",
    "new_contributors": [
        "billiegmbh"
    ],
    "active_installs": 30
}
Low contributor_added Paymob for WooCommerce (5k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugpaymob-for-woocommerce
New contributorsbabarzafar
Active installs5,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "paymob-for-woocommerce",
    "new_contributors": [
        "babarzafar"
    ],
    "active_installs": 5000
}
High release_after_dormancy Slider by 10Web – Responsive Image Slider (10k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugslider-wd
Previous version1.2.62
Current version1.2.63
Dormancy days648
Active installs10,000
Serial offender noteSeverity bumped medium→high: author 10web has 6 prior security-issue closures on wp.org.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "slider-wd",
    "previous_version": "1.2.62",
    "current_version": "1.2.63",
    "dormancy_days": 648,
    "active_installs": 10000,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped medium\u2192high: author 10web has 6 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}
Medium release_after_dormancy Blank Slate (10k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugblank-slate
Previous version1.2.1
Current version1.3.0
Dormancy days1,305
Active installs10,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "blank-slate",
    "previous_version": "1.2.1",
    "current_version": "1.3.0",
    "dormancy_days": 1305,
    "active_installs": 10000
}
Low plugin_closed Vulnity Security (40 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugvulnity
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-24 00:00:00
Active installs40
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "vulnity",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-24 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 40
}
Critical code_pattern FireEMS Stats (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugfireems-stats
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
fireems-stats.php
Line
67
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json
Url hostupgrade.maltesesolutions.com
Slug argfireems-stats
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fireems-stats",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fireems-stats.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json', __FILE__, 'fireems-stats');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://upgrade.maltesesolutions.com/fireems-stats/fireems.json",
    "url_host": "upgrade.maltesesolutions.com",
    "slug_arg": "fireems-stats"
}
Medium release_after_dormancy WP Downgrade | Specific Core Version (100k+ installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwp-downgrade
Previous version1.2.6
Current version1.2.7
Dormancy days1,246
Active installs100,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-downgrade",
    "previous_version": "1.2.6",
    "current_version": "1.2.7",
    "dormancy_days": 1246,
    "active_installs": 100000
}
Critical code_pattern Xmas Widget Little Elf (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugxmas-widget
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
xmas-widget.php
Line
333
Snippet
L320: $request = wp_remote_get( → L333: $data = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "xmas-widget",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "xmas-widget.php",
        "line": 333,
        "snippet": "L320: $request = wp_remote_get(  \u2192  L333: $data = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern MyPress (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmy-press
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version1.01
Hit count1
First hit
File
mypress.php
Line
106
Snippet
$db = new mysqli( $config['database']['hostname'], $config['database']['username'], $config['database']['password'], $config['database']['database'] );
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "my-press",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.01",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "mypress.php",
        "line": 106,
        "snippet": "$db = new mysqli( $config['database']['hostname'], $config['database']['username'], $config['database']['password'], $config['database']['database'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern تایید اعتبار پیامکی (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsms-verification-pars
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
gateways.php
Line
88
Snippet
$baseurl = "http://37.130.202.188/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sms-verification-pars",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "gateways.php",
        "line": 88,
        "snippet": "$baseurl = \"http://37.130.202.188/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Simply Documents (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugsimply-documents
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "simply-documents",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/advanced-custom-fields/core/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Corona Test Results (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugcorona-test-results
Patterndecode_write_dropper
Kindbuiltin
Version1.11.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
corona-test-results-admin-settings.php
Line
1,198
Snippet
define( \'CTR_ENCRYPTION_KEY\', base64_decode( \'' . base64_encode( DataEncryption::getRandomKey() ) . '\' ) );';
Explanationa runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path — the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "corona-test-results",
    "pattern": "decode_write_dropper",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.11.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "corona-test-results-admin-settings.php",
        "line": 1198,
        "snippet": "define( \\'CTR_ENCRYPTION_KEY\\', base64_decode( \\'' . base64_encode( DataEncryption::getRandomKey() ) . '\\' ) );';"
    },
    "explanation": "a runtime decode primitive (`gzuncompress`/`gzinflate`/`gzdecode`/`base64_decode`) feeds a filesystem write (`fwrite`/`file_put_contents`) which is then `include`d/`require`d as a variable path \u2014 the textbook dropper shape: ship an encoded payload as data, decode it to disk at activation/admin-init, and execute it. The siteguarding burner `wp-plugin-management` (audit #43) used exactly this: `fwrite($fp, gzuncompress($c)); include($filename);` in its `register_activation_hook` to plant `siteguarding_tools.php`. Near-zero FP because legit caching writes decoded data but never `include`s a computed path it just wrote."
}
Medium code_pattern Tap To Donate for Give by Jovvie (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjovvie-in-person-payments-givewp
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/Setup.php
Line
48
Snippet
$updateChecker = \Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapegithub_self_distro
Urlhttps://github.com/SupportBizSwoop/Jovvie-Payments-Gateway-GiveWP
Url hostgithub.com
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "jovvie-in-person-payments-givewp",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Setup.php",
        "line": 48,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = \\Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "github_self_distro",
    "url": "https://github.com/SupportBizSwoop/Jovvie-Payments-Gateway-GiveWP",
    "url_host": "github.com",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Schedule Tweets – TweetBoost Free (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugtweetboost
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/plugins/acf/includes/early-access.php
Line
102
Snippet
L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response); → L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tweetboost",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/plugins/acf/includes/early-access.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "L98: $raw_body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($raw_response);  \u2192  L102: $obj = @unserialize( $raw_body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Mercado Lite — Multi-Vendor Marketplace for WooCommerce (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmercado
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version2.3.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
public/rtwmer-class-mercado-public.php
Line
1,629
Snippet
$conn = new mysqli($rtwmer_sql_details['host'],$rtwmer_sql_details['user'],$rtwmer_sql_details['pass'],$rtwmer_sql_details['db']);// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.RestrictedClasses.mysql__mysqli
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mercado",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.3.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "public/rtwmer-class-mercado-public.php",
        "line": 1629,
        "snippet": "$conn = new mysqli($rtwmer_sql_details['host'],$rtwmer_sql_details['user'],$rtwmer_sql_details['pass'],$rtwmer_sql_details['db']);// phpcs:ignore WordPress.DB.RestrictedClasses.mysql__mysqli"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Medium code_pattern TidyBot (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugtidybot
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.9.85
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/Updates.php
Line
26
Snippet
$update_checker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tidybot",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.9.85",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Updates.php",
        "line": 26,
        "snippet": "$update_checker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Low code_pattern WP Roster (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugwp-roster
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.30
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-roster.php
Line
489
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_wp_roster = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-roster
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argwp-roster
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-roster",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.30",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-roster.php",
        "line": 489,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_wp_roster = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-roster",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "wp-roster"
}
Medium code_pattern Dynamic Taxonomy Menu Items (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugdynamic-taxonomy-menu-items
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
classes/Plugin/Plugin.php
Line
289
Snippet
$puc = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker( $this->github, $this->paths->file, $this->plugin );
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "dynamic-taxonomy-menu-items",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/Plugin/Plugin.php",
        "line": 289,
        "snippet": "$puc = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker( $this->github, $this->paths->file, $this->plugin );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern SCD – Smart Currency Detector – Premium Variant for WCFM (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugscd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-wcfm
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
scd_update_checker_wcfm.php
Line
12
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/
Url hostbitbucket.org
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "scd-smart-currency-detector-variant-for-wcfm",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "scd_update_checker_wcfm.php",
        "line": 12,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = SCD_Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://bitbucket.org/Gonima/scda/",
    "url_host": "bitbucket.org",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Low code_pattern Justin (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugjustin
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.5.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
justin.php
Line
167
Snippet
$Checker = Checker::buildUpdateChecker('http://api.morkva.co.ua/api.json', __FILE__);
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttp://api.morkva.co.ua/api.json
Url hostapi.morkva.co.ua
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "justin",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.5.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "justin.php",
        "line": 167,
        "snippet": "$Checker = Checker::buildUpdateChecker('http://api.morkva.co.ua/api.json', __FILE__);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "http://api.morkva.co.ua/api.json",
    "url_host": "api.morkva.co.ua",
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Top Ten Lists (10 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugtop-ten-lists
Patternobfuscated_payload_in_data_file
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip
Line
0
Snippet
(PHP payload in data file — decoded via gzdecode)
Explanationa non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source — either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip — and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 → siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 → v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a "scan signatures database", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "top-ten-lists",
    "pattern": "obfuscated_payload_in_data_file",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bower_components/angular/angular.min.js.gzip",
        "line": 0,
        "snippet": "(PHP payload in data file \u2014 decoded via gzdecode)"
    },
    "explanation": "a non-PHP data file (`.dat`/`.gzs`/`.bin`/etc.) contains PHP source \u2014 either stored raw under a misleading extension or sealed behind base64/gzip \u2014 and/or matches a catalog IOC once decoded. This is the payload-hiding evasion the siteguarding burner fleet used to defeat PHP-only IOC greps: `wp-plugin-management`/`plugin.dat` (gzip+base64 \u2192 siteguarding_tools.php v1.7), `speedup-optimization`/`classes/tools.gzs` (base64 \u2192 v2.1), `bytedefense`/`core/scan_sigs_db.dat` (raw PHP disguised as a \"scan signatures database\", `include`d by a web-reachable `scan.php`). The scanner now decodes these blobs and matches PHP markers + content IOCs inside them."
}
Low plugin_closed MDJM Event Management (40 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmobile-dj-manager
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-29 00:00:00
Active installs50
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mobile-dj-manager",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-29 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 50
}
Low plugin_closed ECU Remapping Performance Calculator (90 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugecu-remapping-performance-calculator
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-29 00:00:00
Active installs90
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ecu-remapping-performance-calculator",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-29 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 90
}
Critical code_pattern Msg91 for WooCommerce (100 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugmsg91-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
config/constants.php
Line
843
Snippet
- If ANY image is missing, empty, http (not https), or hosted on a bare IP address (e.g. `https://35.154.223.210/...`) / `localhost`, do NOT use a carousel. Instead send a NUMBERED TEXT LIST (no image
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "msg91-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "config/constants.php",
        "line": 843,
        "snippet": "- If ANY image is missing, empty, http (not https), or hosted on a bare IP address (e.g. `https://35.154.223.210/...`) / `localhost`, do NOT use a carousel. Instead send a NUMBERED TEXT LIST (no image"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low plugin_closed Is there a problem (70 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugis-there-a-problem
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-30 00:00:00
Active installs70
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "is-there-a-problem",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-30 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 70
}
Low contributor_added Is there a problem (70 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugis-there-a-problem
New contributorsmartindev92
Active installs70
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "is-there-a-problem",
    "new_contributors": [
        "martindev92"
    ],
    "active_installs": 70
}
Low plugin_closed Ali2Woo Migration Tool (50 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugali2woo-migration-tool
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-10-01 00:00:00
Active installs50
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ali2woo-migration-tool",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-10-01 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 50
}
Low plugin_closed Clearblue® Ovulation Calculator (80 installs) Resolved 1mo ago
Slugclearblue-ovulation-calculator
Closed reasontemporary
Closed date2026-09-30 00:00:00
Active installs80
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "clearblue-ovulation-calculator",
    "closed_reason": "temporary",
    "closed_date": "2026-09-30 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 80
}