Events

5,465 events resolved. · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern JS Job Manager (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugjs-jobs
Patternsetup.joomsky.com
Kindioc:domain
Version2.0.2
Hit count5
First hit
File
includes/includer.php
Line
102
Snippet
define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "js-jobs",
    "pattern": "setup.joomsky.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/includer.php",
        "line": 102,
        "snippet": "define('JCONSTV', 'https://setup.joomsky.com/jsjobswp/pro/index.php');"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Email OTP Authenticator – Login, Register & 2FA (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugemail-otp-authenticator
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version6.4.1
Hit count4
First hit
File
lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php
Line
259
Snippet
L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "email-otp-authenticator",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.4.1",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib_old/wp_autoupdate.php",
        "line": 259,
        "snippet": "L254: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L259: //return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Nomiddleman Bitcoin and Crypto Payments for WooCommerce (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/NMM_Blockchain.php
Line
1,357
Snippet
$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nomiddleman-crypto-payments-for-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/NMM_Blockchain.php",
        "line": 1357,
        "snippet": "$request = 'http://108.61.168.86:7890/account/transfers/incoming?address=' . $address;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Online Payment for Bank Mellat (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbank-mellat
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.2
Hit count6
First hit
File
includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php
Line
40
Snippet
$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name .
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bank-mellat",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.2",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/BankMellat/class-bank-mellat-sms.php",
        "line": 40,
        "snippet": "$result = wp_remote_get( 'http://185.4.28.180/class/sms/webservice/send_url.php?from=' . $sms_line_number . '&to=' . $admin_mobile . '&msg=' . urlencode( $sms_text ) . '&uname=' . $sms_user_name ."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – Email Users (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugevents-manager-email-users
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.8.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "events-manager-email-users",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.8.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Abandoned Contact Form 7 (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugabandoned-contact-form-7
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/class.cf7af.update.php
Line
162
Snippet
L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params ); → L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "abandoned-contact-form-7",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/class.cf7af.update.php",
        "line": 162,
        "snippet": "L155: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L162: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Low code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Medium recent_prt_intervention Bolt CTA Button – Floating Call Button for WordPress (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbolt-cta-button
Active installs1,000
Is closedno
Prt committersplugin-master
First touch2026-04-23 10:33:46
Last touch2026-04-23 10:33:46
Commit count1
Commits sample
CommitterAtMessage
plugin-master2026-04-23 10:33:46Adding Bolt CTA Button by ismeteroglu.
Lookback days30
Explanationwp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bolt-cta-button",
    "active_installs": 1000,
    "is_closed": false,
    "prt_committers": [
        "plugin-master"
    ],
    "first_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
    "last_touch": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
    "commit_count": 1,
    "commits_sample": [
        {
            "committer": "plugin-master",
            "at": "2026-04-23 10:33:46",
            "message": "Adding Bolt CTA Button by ismeteroglu."
        }
    ],
    "lookback_days": 30,
    "explanation": "wp.org Plugin Review Team committer touched this plugin within the last 30 days. PRT commits are confirmation-grade signal: they only happen when wp.org has already triaged the plugin as an incident."
}
High compromised_committer_burst WP Travel – Ultimate Travel Booking System, Tour Management Engine (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-travel
Author slugwptravel
Burst start2026-05-04 05:42:03
Burst end2026-05-04 05:58:28
Burst commits12
Burst window minutes90
Tenure days664
Distinct messages3
Avg message length20
Top messageadding updated files
Top message count10
Prt revert—
ExplanationEstablished author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-travel",
    "author_slug": "wptravel",
    "burst_start": "2026-05-04 05:42:03",
    "burst_end": "2026-05-04 05:58:28",
    "burst_commits": 12,
    "burst_window_minutes": 90,
    "tenure_days": 664,
    "distinct_messages": 3,
    "avg_message_length": 19.7,
    "top_message": "adding updated files",
    "top_message_count": 10,
    "prt_revert": null,
    "explanation": "Established author committed 12 revisions inside a 90-minute window with low-entropy commit messages. Pattern matches the June 2024 wp.org credential-stuffing wave shape; bumped to critical when followed by a wp.org Plugin Review Team revert within 7 days."
}
Low plugin_closed Tm – WordPress Redirection (10 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtm-wordpress-redirection
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs10
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tm-wordpress-redirection",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 10
}
Low plugin_closed Udimi Tools (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugudimi-optin
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs30
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "udimi-optin",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 30
}
Low plugin_closed Woo Commerce Minimum Weight (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoo-commerce-min-weight
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woo-commerce-min-weight",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}
Low plugin_closed Zawgyi Embed (20 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugzawgyi-embed
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs20
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "zawgyi-embed",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 20
}
Medium plugin_closed Fancy Image Show (80 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfancy-image-show
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs80
Serial offender noteSeverity bumped low→medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fancy-image-show",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 80,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped low\u2192medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}
Medium contributor_added Fancy Image Show (80 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfancy-image-show
New contributorsgopi_plus
Active installs80
Serial offender noteSeverity bumped low→medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fancy-image-show",
    "new_contributors": [
        "gopi_plus"
    ],
    "active_installs": 80,
    "serial_offender_note": "Severity bumped low\u2192medium: author gopi_plus has 7 prior security-issue closures on wp.org."
}
Low plugin_closed SP Blog Designer (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsp-blog-designer
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs60
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "sp-blog-designer",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 60
}
Low plugin_closed Next Date (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnextdate
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nextdate",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Low plugin_closed NMR Strava activities (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnmr-strava-activities
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs80
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nmr-strava-activities",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 80
}
Low plugin_closed GoodMeet – Meetings & Classes for Google Meet (60 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggoodmeet
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "goodmeet",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Low plugin_closed Forms RB – Contact Form Builder & Custom Forms (100 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugforms-rb
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs100
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "forms-rb",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 100
}
Critical code_pattern SaFly Curl Patch (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsafly-curl-patch
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
SaFly-Curl-Patch.php
Line
70
Snippet
$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "safly-curl-patch",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "SaFly-Curl-Patch.php",
        "line": 70,
        "snippet": "$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Country Caching For WP Super Cache (200 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version0.8.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
cc_wpsc_init.php
Line
17
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.8.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cc_wpsc_init.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache"
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternw.anadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count4
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "w.anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternanadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count6
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Category Country Aware WordPress (100 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcategory-country-aware
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
cca_init.php
Line
20
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json', __FILE__, 'category-country-aware');
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcategory-country-aware
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "category-country-aware",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cca_init.php",
        "line": 20,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker('http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json',\t__FILE__,\t'category-country-aware');"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com/meta_cca.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "category-country-aware"
}
Low plugin_closed Shortcodely (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugshortcodely
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs400
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "shortcodely",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 400
}
Low plugin_closed Product Catalog (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtc-product-catalog
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs300
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "tc-product-catalog",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 300
}
Critical code_pattern Skrill – WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugofficial-skrill-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.73
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php
Line
49
Snippet
protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "official-skrill-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.73",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Medium code_pattern Hero Posts Lite (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughero-posts-lite
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php
Line
79
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hero-posts-lite",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php",
        "line": 79,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Slugembedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php
Line
148
Snippet
L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); → L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "embedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 148,
        "snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Broadcast Live Video – Live Streaming : WebRTC, HLS, RTSP, RTMP (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugvideowhisper-live-streaming-integration
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version7.1.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/options.php
Line
424
Snippet
'appRoles' => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:"conferenceParticipantCamera";a:3:{s:5:"roles";s:30:"administrator,performer,client";s:5:"value";s:1:"1";s:5:"other";s:0:"";}s:8:"ba
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "videowhisper-live-streaming-integration",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.1.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/options.php",
        "line": 424,
        "snippet": "'appRoles'                        => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:\"conferenceParticipantCamera\";a:3:{s:5:\"roles\";s:30:\"administrator,performer,client\";s:5:\"value\";s:1:\"1\";s:5:\"other\";s:0:\"\";}s:8:\"ba"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Restaurant Price List (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-restaurant-price-list
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php
Line
204
Snippet
L196: $request = wp_remote_post( → L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-restaurant-price-list",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php",
        "line": 204,
        "snippet": "L196: $request = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Epeken All Kurir for Woocommerce (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugepeken-all-kurir
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.6
Hit count4
First hit
File
epeken_courier.php
Line
18
Snippet
$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server..
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "epeken-all-kurir",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.6",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "epeken_courier.php",
        "line": 18,
        "snippet": "$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server.."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Publitio (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpublitio
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/publitio_api.php
Line
125
Snippet
L114: $response = curl_exec($curl); → L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "publitio",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/publitio_api.php",
        "line": 125,
        "snippet": "L114: $response = curl_exec($curl);  \u2192  L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Multibanco / MB Way / Payshop (by LUSOPAY) for WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmultibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php
Line
456
Snippet
$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "multibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php",
        "line": 456,
        "snippet": "$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Opal Woo Custom Product Variation (300 installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugopal-woo-custom-product-variation
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.3.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php
Line
65
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json
Url hostsource.wpopal.com
Slug argopal-woo-custom-product-variation
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.3.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json",
    "url_host": "source.wpopal.com",
    "slug_arg": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation"
}
Critical code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – OpenStreetMaps (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstonehenge-em-osm
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.2.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stonehenge-em-osm",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.2.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Low code_pattern WP GoToWebinar (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-gotowebinar
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version15.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-gotowebinar.php
Line
1,179
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argwp-gotowebinar
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-gotowebinar",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "15.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-gotowebinar.php",
        "line": 1179,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "wp-gotowebinar"
}
Medium code_pattern Yoo Slider – Image Slider & Video Slider (500 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugyoo-slider
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
yoo-slider.php
Line
56
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yoo-slider",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "yoo-slider.php",
        "line": 56,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern Tussendoor – Open RDW (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugopen-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version5.3.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
app/Updater.php
Line
60
Snippet
self::$updater = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "open-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.3.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/Updater.php",
        "line": 60,
        "snippet": "self::$updater      = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Hitsteps Web Analytics (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughitsteps-visitor-manager
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.91
Hit count2
First hit
File
api.payload.php
Line
4
Snippet
$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1="http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hitsteps-visitor-manager",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.91",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "api.payload.php",
        "line": 4,
        "snippet": "$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1=\"http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Low plugin_closed AI Copilot – Content Generator (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugai-copilot-content-generator
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs1,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ai-copilot-content-generator",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 1000
}
Low plugin_closed Notification for Telegram (4k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnotification-for-telegram
Closed reason—
Closed date2026-05-06 00:00:00
Active installs4,000
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "notification-for-telegram",
    "closed_reason": "",
    "closed_date": "2026-05-06 00:00:00",
    "active_installs": 4000
}