Events

417 events (filtered). · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern SiteOrigin Widgets Bundle (400k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugso-widgets-bundle
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.72.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
base/inc/lib/Less/Parser.php
Line
656
Snippet
L656: $cache = unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file)); → L656: $cache = unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "so-widgets-bundle",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.72.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "base/inc/lib/Less/Parser.php",
        "line": 656,
        "snippet": "L656: $cache = unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file));  \u2192  L656: $cache = unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Slugpost-smtp
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.9.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
includes/libs/HTMLPurifier/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php
Line
73
Snippet
L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file)); → L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "post-smtp",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.9.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/libs/HTMLPurifier/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php",
        "line": 73,
        "snippet": "L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));  \u2192  L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Critical code_pattern MailPoet – Newsletters, Email Marketing, and Automation (500k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmailpoet
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version5.23.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
lib/Doctrine/MetadataCache.php
Line
38
Snippet
L38: return unserialize((string)file_get_contents($this->getFilename($id))); → L38: return unserialize((string)file_get_contents($this->getFilename($id)));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "mailpoet",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.23.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/Doctrine/MetadataCache.php",
        "line": 38,
        "snippet": "L38: return unserialize((string)file_get_contents($this->getFilename($id)));  \u2192  L38: return unserialize((string)file_get_contents($this->getFilename($id)));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Slugfluent-smtp
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.95
Hit count1
First hit
File
app/Services/NotificationHelper.php
Line
328
Snippet
L312: $body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response); → L328: $sendingTo = self::unserialize(Arr::get($logData, 'to'));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fluent-smtp",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.95",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/Services/NotificationHelper.php",
        "line": 328,
        "snippet": "L312: $body = wp_remote_retrieve_body($response);  \u2192  L328: $sendingTo = self::unserialize(Arr::get($logData, 'to'));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Critical code_pattern Slider, Gallery, and Carousel by MetaSlider – Image Slider, Video Slider (500k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugml-slider
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.108.0
Hit count3
First hit
File
lib/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php
Line
73
Snippet
L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file)); → L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ml-slider",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.108.0",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "lib/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php",
        "line": 73,
        "snippet": "L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));  \u2192  L73: return unserialize(file_get_contents($file));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Slugkirki
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version5.2.3
Hit count3
First hit
File
customizer/packages/controls/tabs/edd/EDD_SL_Plugin_Updater.php
Line
545
Snippet
L527: $request = wp_remote_post( → L545: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "kirki",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.2.3",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "customizer/packages/controls/tabs/edd/EDD_SL_Plugin_Updater.php",
        "line": 545,
        "snippet": "L527: $request = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L545: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Critical code_pattern PixelYourSite – Your smart PIXEL (TAG) & API Manager (400k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpixelyoursite
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version11.2.0.4
Hit count3
First hit
File
includes/class-plugin-updater.php
Line
401
Snippet
L393: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->api_url, → L401: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "pixelyoursite",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "11.2.0.4",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-plugin-updater.php",
        "line": 401,
        "snippet": "L393: $request    = wp_remote_post( $this->api_url,  \u2192  L401: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Slugninja-forms
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.14.2
Hit count5
First hit
File
includes/Admin/Menus/ImportExport.php
Line
128
Snippet
L111: $import = file_get_contents( $_FILES[ 'nf_import_fields' ][ 'tmp_name' ] ); → L128: $return = unserialize($serializedValue,['allowed_classes'=>false]);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ninja-forms",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.14.2",
    "hit_count": 5,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Admin/Menus/ImportExport.php",
        "line": 128,
        "snippet": "L111: $import = file_get_contents( $_FILES[ 'nf_import_fields' ][ 'tmp_name' ] );  \u2192  L128: $return = unserialize($serializedValue,['allowed_classes'=>false]);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`/`file_get_contents`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak."
}
Slugpopup-maker
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.22.0
Hit count3
First hit
File
classes/Extension/Updater.php
Line
670
Snippet
L652: $request = wp_remote_get(// Uses wp_remote_post() in EDD Sample. → L670: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "popup-maker",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.22.0",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/Extension/Updater.php",
        "line": 670,
        "snippet": "L652: $request = wp_remote_get(// Uses wp_remote_post() in EDD Sample.  \u2192  L670: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern Polylang (900k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpolylang
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.8.2
Hit count3
First hit
File
src/install/plugin-updater.php
Line
635
Snippet
L617: $request = wp_remote_post( → L635: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "polylang",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.8.2",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/install/plugin-updater.php",
        "line": 635,
        "snippet": "L617: $request = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L635: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern Widgets for Google Reviews (1M+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-reviews-plugin-for-google
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version13.2.9
Hit count1
First hit
File
trustindex-plugin.class.php
Line
7,088
Snippet
L7078: $wpResponse = wp_remote_post( → L7088: $wpRepoResponse = unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($wpResponse));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-reviews-plugin-for-google",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "13.2.9",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "trustindex-plugin.class.php",
        "line": 7088,
        "snippet": "L7078: $wpResponse = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L7088: $wpRepoResponse = unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($wpResponse));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern Complianz GDPR/CCPA Cookie Consent Banner (1M+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugcomplianz-gdpr
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version7.4.6
Hit count3
First hit
File
upgrade/upgrade-to-pro.php
Line
285
Snippet
L279: $request = wp_remote_post( $this->api_url, array( 'timeout' => 15, 'sslverify' => tr → L285: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "complianz-gdpr",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.4.6",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "upgrade/upgrade-to-pro.php",
        "line": 285,
        "snippet": "L279: $request    = wp_remote_post( $this->api_url, array( 'timeout' => 15, 'sslverify' => tr  \u2192  L285: $request->sections = maybe_unserialize( $request->sections );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern Essential Addons for Elementor – Popular Elementor Templates & Widgets (1M+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugessential-addons-for-elementor-lite
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version6.6.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/Classes/WPDeveloper_Plugin_Installer.php
Line
76
Snippet
L57: $response = wp_remote_post( → L76: return unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($response));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "essential-addons-for-elementor-lite",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.6.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Classes/WPDeveloper_Plugin_Installer.php",
        "line": 76,
        "snippet": "L57: $response = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L76: return unserialize(wp_remote_retrieve_body($response));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Sluggoogle-analytics-for-wordpress
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version10.1.3
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/gutenberg/headline-tool/phpinsight/lib/PHPInsight/Sentiment.php
Line
230
Snippet
L229: $temp = file_get_contents( $fn ); → L230: $words = unserialize( trim( $temp ) );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "google-analytics-for-wordpress",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "10.1.3",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/gutenberg/headline-tool/phpinsight/lib/PHPInsight/Sentiment.php",
        "line": 230,
        "snippet": "L229: $temp  = file_get_contents( $fn );  \u2192  L230: $words = unserialize( trim( $temp ) );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern Jetpack – AI Agents & MCP, Security, Backup & Analytics (3M+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugjetpack
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version15.7.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
jetpack_vendor/automattic/jetpack-waf/src/class-waf-stats.php
Line
151
Snippet
L137: $body = json_decode( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response ) ); → L151: return maybe_unserialize( get_option( 'jetpack_protect_global_stats' ) );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "jetpack",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "15.7.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "jetpack_vendor/automattic/jetpack-waf/src/class-waf-stats.php",
        "line": 151,
        "snippet": "L137: $body = json_decode( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $response ) );  \u2192  L151: return maybe_unserialize( get_option( 'jetpack_protect_global_stats' ) );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Critical code_pattern UpdraftPlus: WP Backup & Migration Plugin (4M+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugupdraftplus
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.26.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
backup.php
Line
3,604
Snippet
L3604: $var = $updraftplus->unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file_base.'-info.tmp')); → L3604: $var = $updraftplus->unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file_base.'-info.tmp'));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "updraftplus",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.26.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "backup.php",
        "line": 3604,
        "snippet": "L3604: $var = $updraftplus->unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file_base.'-info.tmp'));  \u2192  L3604: $var = $updraftplus->unserialize(file_get_contents($cache_file_base.'-info.tmp'));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}
Slugwpforms-lite
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.10.0.4
Hit count3
First hit
File
vendor_prefixed/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php
Line
71
Snippet
L71: return \unserialize(\file_get_contents($file)); → L71: return \unserialize(\file_get_contents($file));
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wpforms-lite",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.10.0.4",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "vendor_prefixed/ezyang/htmlpurifier/library/HTMLPurifier/DefinitionCache/Serializer.php",
        "line": 71,
        "snippet": "L71: return \\unserialize(\\file_get_contents($file));  \u2192  L71: return \\unserialize(\\file_get_contents($file));"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*`/`curl_exec`) is followed by `unserialize`/`maybe_unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget used by EP and most WP supply-chain backdoors. Legit plugins essentially never do this."
}