Events

446 events (filtered). · Last rule pass 1d ago. · 235 open / 5,465 resolved overall.

State: Open Resolved All
Critical code_pattern 1ON1 URL REDIRECTS (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slug1on1-url-redirects
Patternw.anadnet.com
Kindioc:domain
Version0.11
Hit count4
First hit
File
1ON1_URL_Redirects.php
Line
903
Snippet
if( $url == "http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs" )
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "1on1-url-redirects",
    "pattern": "w.anadnet.com",
    "kind": "ioc:domain",
    "version": "0.11",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "1ON1_URL_Redirects.php",
        "line": 903,
        "snippet": "if( $url == \"http://www.anadnet.com/?feed=qppr_faqs\" )"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Country Caching For WP Super Cache (200 installs) Suspicious 6mo ago
Slugcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version0.8.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
cc_wpsc_init.php
Line
17
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json
Url hostblog.XXXXXXXX.com
Slug argcountry-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.8.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "cc_wpsc_init.php",
        "line": 17,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://blog.XXXXXXXX.com/meta_ccwpsc.json",
    "url_host": "blog.XXXXXXXX.com",
    "slug_arg": "country-caching-extension-for-wp-super-cache"
}
Critical code_pattern SaFly Curl Patch (200 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsafly-curl-patch
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
SaFly-Curl-Patch.php
Line
70
Snippet
$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "safly-curl-patch",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "SaFly-Curl-Patch.php",
        "line": 70,
        "snippet": "$ip = wp_remote_retrieve_body(wp_remote_get('http://119.29.29.29/d?dn=' . $domain));"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Slugembedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php
Line
148
Snippet
L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); → L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "embedding-barcodes-into-product-pages-and-orders",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 148,
        "snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Medium code_pattern Hero Posts Lite (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughero-posts-lite
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php
Line
79
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hero-posts-lite",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "bold-builder-light/bold-builder-light.php",
        "line": 79,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern Skrill – WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugofficial-skrill-woocommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.0.73
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php
Line
49
Snippet
protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "official-skrill-woocommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.0.73",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/core/class-skrill-payment.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "protected static $skrill_version_controll_api_url = 'http://81.169.251.23:9097/sendVersion';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Opal Woo Custom Product Variation (300 installs) Benign 6mo ago
Slugopal-woo-custom-product-variation
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.3.5
Hit count1
First hit
File
opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php
Line
65
Snippet
Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttp://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json
Url hostsource.wpopal.com
Slug argopal-woo-custom-product-variation
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.3.5",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation.php",
        "line": 65,
        "snippet": "Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "http://source.wpopal.com/plugins/opal/opal-woo-custom-product-variation.json",
    "url_host": "source.wpopal.com",
    "slug_arg": "opal-woo-custom-product-variation"
}
Critical code_pattern Multibanco / MB Way / Payshop (by LUSOPAY) for WooCommerce (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmultibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0.2
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php
Line
456
Snippet
$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "multibanco-e-ou-payshop-by-lusopay",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0.2",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-wc-lusopay-pisp.php",
        "line": 456,
        "snippet": "$lusopay_url = 'http://185.15.20.221:8080/web_dev/run/PISP/' . $chave . '/' . $order_value . '/' . $currency . '/' . $description . '/' . $currentLang;"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Publitio (300 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpublitio
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.6
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/publitio_api.php
Line
125
Snippet
L114: $response = curl_exec($curl); → L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "publitio",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.6",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/publitio_api.php",
        "line": 125,
        "snippet": "L114: $response = curl_exec($curl);  \u2192  L125: $unserialized_response = @unserialize($response);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Epeken All Kurir for Woocommerce (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugepeken-all-kurir
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.0.6
Hit count4
First hit
File
epeken_courier.php
Line
18
Snippet
$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server..
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "epeken-all-kurir",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.0.6",
    "hit_count": 4,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "epeken_courier.php",
        "line": 18,
        "snippet": "$server = 'http://174.138.21.166'; //default data server.."
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern WP Restaurant Price List (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-restaurant-price-list
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.4.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php
Line
204
Snippet
L196: $request = wp_remote_post( → L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-restaurant-price-list",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.4.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "assets/meta-box/inc/update/checker.php",
        "line": 204,
        "snippet": "L196: $request = wp_remote_post(  \u2192  L204: return $response ? @unserialize( $response ) : false;"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Broadcast Live Video – Live Streaming : WebRTC, HLS, RTSP, RTMP (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugvideowhisper-live-streaming-integration
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version7.1.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/options.php
Line
424
Snippet
'appRoles' => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:"conferenceParticipantCamera";a:3:{s:5:"roles";s:30:"administrator,performer,client";s:5:"value";s:1:"1";s:5:"other";s:0:"";}s:8:"ba
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "videowhisper-live-streaming-integration",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.1.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/options.php",
        "line": 424,
        "snippet": "'appRoles'                        => unserialize( 'a:3:{s:27:\"conferenceParticipantCamera\";a:3:{s:5:\"roles\";s:30:\"administrator,performer,client\";s:5:\"value\";s:1:\"1\";s:5:\"other\";s:0:\"\";}s:8:\"ba"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Medium code_pattern Tussendoor – Open RDW (400 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugopen-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version5.3.0
Hit count2
First hit
File
app/Updater.php
Line
60
Snippet
self::$updater = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "open-rdw-kenteken-voertuiginformatie",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.3.0",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "app/Updater.php",
        "line": 60,
        "snippet": "self::$updater      = Factory::buildUpdateChecker($metadataUrl, $fullPath, $slug);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern Yoo Slider – Image Slider & Video Slider (500 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugyoo-slider
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.2.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
yoo-slider.php
Line
56
Snippet
$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yoo-slider",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.2.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "yoo-slider.php",
        "line": 56,
        "snippet": "$updateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Low code_pattern WP GoToWebinar (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-gotowebinar
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version15.11
Hit count1
First hit
File
wp-gotowebinar.php
Line
1,179
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapevendor_updater
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argwp-gotowebinar
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-gotowebinar",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "15.11",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "wp-gotowebinar.php",
        "line": 1179,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_wp_gotowebinar = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "vendor_updater",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=wp-gotowebinar",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "wp-gotowebinar"
}
Medium code_pattern Events Manager – OpenStreetMaps (600 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugstonehenge-em-osm
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version4.2.1
Hit count3
First hit
File
stonehenge/class-updater.php
Line
49
Snippet
$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "stonehenge-em-osm",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.2.1",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "stonehenge/class-updater.php",
        "line": 49,
        "snippet": "$UpdateChecker = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern IdeaPush (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugideapush
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version8.77
Hit count1
First hit
File
ideapush.php
Line
1,220
Snippet
$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapehijack
Urlhttps://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush
Url hostnorthernbeacheswebsites.com.au
Slug argideapush
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "ideapush",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.77",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "ideapush.php",
        "line": 1220,
        "snippet": "$plugin_update_checker_ideapush = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "hijack",
    "url": "https://northernbeacheswebsites.com.au/?update_action=get_metadata&update_slug=ideapush",
    "url_host": "northernbeacheswebsites.com.au",
    "slug_arg": "ideapush"
}
Critical code_pattern Hitsteps Web Analytics (700 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slughitsteps-visitor-manager
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.91
Hit count2
First hit
File
api.payload.php
Line
4
Snippet
$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1="http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "hitsteps-visitor-manager",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.91",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "api.payload.php",
        "line": 4,
        "snippet": "$hitsteps_public_web_api_receiver1=\"http://144.76.44.111/api/query.php\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Nexter Extension – Security, Performance, Code Snippets & Site Toolkit (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugnexter-extension
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.6.8
Hit count2
First hit
File
include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php
Line
779
Snippet
L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args); → L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "nexter-extension",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.6.8",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "include/panel-settings/class-nxt-panel-ajax-router.php",
        "line": 779,
        "snippet": "L769: $response = wp_remote_post($theme_api_url, $args);  \u2192  L779: $theme_info = @unserialize( $body );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern PowerPress Podcasting plugin by Blubrry (20k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugpowerpress
PatternPluginGuest
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version11.16.3
Hit count1
First hit
File
powerpress.php
Line
71
Snippet
$affectedusernames = ['PluginAUTH', 'PluginGuest', 'Options'];
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "powerpress",
    "pattern": "PluginGuest",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "11.16.3",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "powerpress.php",
        "line": 71,
        "snippet": "$affectedusernames = ['PluginAUTH', 'PluginGuest', 'Options'];"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Medium code_pattern EU VAT Assistant for WooCommerce (5k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwoocommerce-eu-vat-assistant
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1.30.260413
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/embedded-framework/wc-aelia-foundation-classes-embedded/src/lib/classes/base/plugin/aelia-plugin.php
Line
142
Snippet
$update_checker = \YahnisElsts\PluginUpdateChecker\v5\PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker( // NOSONAR
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "woocommerce-eu-vat-assistant",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.30.260413",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/embedded-framework/wc-aelia-foundation-classes-embedded/src/lib/classes/base/plugin/aelia-plugin.php",
        "line": 142,
        "snippet": "$update_checker = \\YahnisElsts\\PluginUpdateChecker\\v5\\PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker( // NOSONAR"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern If-So Dynamic Content – Elementor & All Page Builders Personalization (7k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugif-so
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version1.9.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
extensions/extension-base/extension-initializer-base.class.php
Line
16
Snippet
$myUpdateChecker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker( //Check for updates
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "if-so",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.9.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "extensions/extension-base/extension-initializer-base.class.php",
        "line": 16,
        "snippet": "$myUpdateChecker = PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker(      //Check for updates"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern Microthemer (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugmicrothemer
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version7.5.3.9
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/Content/PluginUpdater.php
Line
38
Snippet
$this->updateChecker = \YahnisElsts\PluginUpdateChecker\v5p6\PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker(
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "microthemer",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.5.3.9",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/Content/PluginUpdater.php",
        "line": 38,
        "snippet": "$this->updateChecker = \\YahnisElsts\\PluginUpdateChecker\\v5p6\\PucFactory::buildUpdateChecker("
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Medium code_pattern Welcart e-Commerce (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugusc-e-shop
Patternpuc_update_hijack
Kindbuiltin
Version2.11.28
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/update_check.php
Line
194
Snippet
$$slug = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker( $json_path, $fullpath, $slug );
Explanationplugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` — the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.
Shapeunparseable
Url—
Url host—
Slug arg—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "usc-e-shop",
    "pattern": "puc_update_hijack",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.11.28",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/update_check.php",
        "line": 194,
        "snippet": "$$slug     = Puc_v4_Factory::buildUpdateChecker( $json_path, $fullpath, $slug );"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin calls `::buildUpdateChecker()` \u2014 the factory entry point of the Yahnis Elsts Plugin Update Checker library. A plugin distributed through wordpress.org that registers its own update source is bypassing the Plugin Review Team: every install polls the non-wp.org URL on cron and installs whatever JSON + zip it returns, with full plugin-author permissions. This is the mechanism behind the `anadnet`/quick-pagepost-redirect-plugin compromise (2021) where the author seeded 70,000+ installs through tagged releases and then removed the library from trunk to hide the persistence. Any URL argument pointing away from `downloads.wordpress.org`/`api.wordpress.org` is the hijack signal.",
    "shape": "unparseable",
    "url": null,
    "url_host": null,
    "slug_arg": null
}
Critical code_pattern WPOSS阿里云对象存储 (800 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwposs
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
sdk/aliyun-oss-php-sdk/src/OSS/OssClient.php
Line
2,705
Snippet
const OSS_HOST_TYPE_IP = "ip"; //http://1.1.1.1/bucket/object
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wposs",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "sdk/aliyun-oss-php-sdk/src/OSS/OssClient.php",
        "line": 2705,
        "snippet": "const OSS_HOST_TYPE_IP = \"ip\";  //http://1.1.1.1/bucket/object"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Sluga4-barcode-generator
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.4.12
Hit count1
First hit
File
class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php
Line
148
Snippet
L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); → L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "a4-barcode-generator",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.4.12",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class/Updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 148,
        "snippet": "L145: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L148: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Slugbarcode-scanner-lite-pos-to-manage-products-inventory-and-orders
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.12.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/features/updater/WpAutoUpdate.php
Line
149
Snippet
L146: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params); → L149: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "barcode-scanner-lite-pos-to-manage-products-inventory-and-orders",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.12.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/features/updater/WpAutoUpdate.php",
        "line": 149,
        "snippet": "L146: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params);  \u2192  L149: $serverData = @unserialize($request['body']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Formidable PRO2PDF (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugformidablepro-2-pdf
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version3.23
Hit count1
First hit
File
fpropdf.php
Line
604
Snippet
L591: $request = wp_remote_get($url); → L604: $files = @unserialize($row['value']);
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "formidablepro-2-pdf",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.23",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fpropdf.php",
        "line": 604,
        "snippet": "L591: $request = wp_remote_get($url);  \u2192  L604: $files = @unserialize($row['value']);"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Operation Demo Importer – Demo Importer For WPoperation Themes (800 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugoperation-demo-importer
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
classes/importers/class-settings-importer.php
Line
44
Snippet
L28: $contents = curl_exec($ch); → L44: $data = @unserialize( $raw );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "operation-demo-importer",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "classes/importers/class-settings-importer.php",
        "line": 44,
        "snippet": "L28: $contents = curl_exec($ch);  \u2192  L44: $data = @unserialize( $raw );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern iControlWP (900 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugworpit-admin-dashboard-plugin
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version5.5.4
Hit count8
First hit
File
src/features/plugin.php
Line
46
Snippet
'sAuthKey' => $this->getPluginAuthKey(),
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "worpit-admin-dashboard-plugin",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "5.5.4",
    "hit_count": 8,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/features/plugin.php",
        "line": 46,
        "snippet": "'sAuthKey'                  => $this->getPluginAuthKey(),"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern WappPress – Convert Site to App Fast – WordPress to Mobile App Builder (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwapppress-builds-android-app-for-website
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version8.0.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/wappPress_admin_setting.php
Line
2,524
Snippet
$ip = 'http://199.38.85.107/aapi';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wapppress-builds-android-app-for-website",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.0.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/wappPress_admin_setting.php",
        "line": 2524,
        "snippet": "$ip = 'http://199.38.85.107/aapi';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Yektanet Ecommerce (800 installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugyektanet-ecommerce
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.6
Hit count2
First hit
File
settings/vars.php
Line
8
Snippet
$product_update_api_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yektanet-ecommerce",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.6",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "settings/vars.php",
        "line": 8,
        "snippet": "$product_update_api_url = 'http://87.247.185.150/products';"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern FV Player 8 (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfv-player
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version8.1.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/fp-api-private.php
Line
249
Snippet
L239: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request ); → L249: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\*[\s\S]*?\*/\s+~', '', $raw_respons
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fv-player",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "8.1.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/fp-api-private.php",
        "line": 249,
        "snippet": "L239: $raw_response = wp_remote_post( $this->strPrivateAPI, $request );  \u2192  L249: $response = @unserialize( preg_replace( '~^/\\*[\\s\\S]*?\\*/\\s+~', '', $raw_respons"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Slugbit-pi
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.19.0
Hit count6
First hit
File
backend/app/src/Authorization/AuthorizationFactory.php
Line
78
Snippet
$freePluginAuthorizationClass = NodeExecutor::BASE_INTEGRATION_NAMESPACE . "{$appSlug}\\{$appSlug}Authorization";
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bit-pi",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.19.0",
    "hit_count": 6,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "backend/app/src/Authorization/AuthorizationFactory.php",
        "line": 78,
        "snippet": "$freePluginAuthorizationClass = NodeExecutor::BASE_INTEGRATION_NAMESPACE . \"{$appSlug}\\\\{$appSlug}Authorization\";"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern aapanel WP Toolkit (1k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugaapanel-wp-toolkit
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version1.2
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/class-aapanel-wp-toolkit-agent.php
Line
47
Snippet
$user_id = $wpdb->get_var("select `user_id` from " . $wpdb->usermeta . " where `meta_key` = '" . $wpdb->prefix . "capabilities' and `meta_value` like '%s:13:\"administrator\";b:1;%'"); // retrieve s
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "aapanel-wp-toolkit",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.2",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/class-aapanel-wp-toolkit-agent.php",
        "line": 47,
        "snippet": "$user_id = $wpdb->get_var(\"select `user_id` from \" . $wpdb->usermeta . \" where `meta_key` = '\" . $wpdb->prefix . \"capabilities' and `meta_value` like '%s:13:\\\"administrator\\\";b:1;%'\"); // retrieve s"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern ApplyOnline – Application Form Builder and Manager (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugapply-online
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version2.6.8.1
Hit count1
First hit
File
class-addons-update.php
Line
153
Snippet
L149: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L153: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "apply-online",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.6.8.1",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "class-addons-update.php",
        "line": 153,
        "snippet": "L149: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L153: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Kargo Takip, WooCommerce & Dokan Kargo Takip, SMS ve E-posta (2k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugkargo-takip-turkiye
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version0.2.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
config.php
Line
67
Snippet
"url" => "http://85.99.122.231/hareket.asp?har_kod=",
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "kargo-takip-turkiye",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "0.2.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "config.php",
        "line": 67,
        "snippet": "\"url\" => \"http://85.99.122.231/hareket.asp?har_kod=\","
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Gallery with thumbnail slider (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Sluggallery-with-thumbnail-slider
Patternfilter_the_content_in_the_main_loop
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version8.1
Hit count2
First hit
File
gwts-slider.php
Line
6
Snippet
function gwts_gwl_filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop( $content ) {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "gallery-with-thumbnail-slider",
    "pattern": "filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "8.1",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "gwts-slider.php",
        "line": 6,
        "snippet": "function gwts_gwl_filter_the_content_in_the_main_loop( $content ) {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Live Chat with Messenger Customer Chat (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugfb-messenger-live-chat
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.5.0
Hit count1
First hit
File
fb-messenger-live-chat.php
Line
116
Snippet
$form = '<form class="ztb-register-form" target="_blank" method="POST" action="'.$domain_action.'/customer/access/PluginAuth?app=fbc&utm_source=wordpress.com&utm_medium=Facebook Live Chat&utm_campai
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "fb-messenger-live-chat",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.5.0",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "fb-messenger-live-chat.php",
        "line": 116,
        "snippet": "$form = '<form class=\"ztb-register-form\" target=\"_blank\" method=\"POST\" action=\"'.$domain_action.'/customer/access/PluginAuth?app=fbc&utm_source=wordpress.com&utm_medium=Facebook Live Chat&utm_campai"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern Spider Analyser – WordPress搜索引擎蜘蛛分析插件 (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugspider-analyser
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.1.3
Hit count3
First hit
File
spider_info.php
Line
8,889
Snippet
'bot_url' => 'http://195.37.190.77/',
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "spider-analyser",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.1.3",
    "hit_count": 3,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "spider_info.php",
        "line": 8889,
        "snippet": "'bot_url' => 'http://195.37.190.77/',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern WP EasyCart: Shopping Cart and eCommerce Store (3k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-easycart
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version5.8.14
Hit count1
First hit
File
inc/aws/Aws/data/s3/2006-03-01/endpoint-tests-1.json.php
Line
3
Snippet
return [ 'testCases' => [ [ 'documentation' => 'region is not a valid DNS-suffix', 'expect' => [ 'error' => 'Invalid region: region was not a valid DNS name.', ], 'params' => [ 'Region' => 'a b', 'Use
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-easycart",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.8.14",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "inc/aws/Aws/data/s3/2006-03-01/endpoint-tests-1.json.php",
        "line": 3,
        "snippet": "return [ 'testCases' => [ [ 'documentation' => 'region is not a valid DNS-suffix', 'expect' => [ 'error' => 'Invalid region: region was not a valid DNS name.', ], 'params' => [ 'Region' => 'a b', 'Use"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern RSFirewall! (4k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugrsfirewall
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version1.1.46
Hit count1
First hit
File
libraries/autoupdate.php
Line
180
Snippet
L176: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params ); → L180: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "rsfirewall",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "1.1.46",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "libraries/autoupdate.php",
        "line": 180,
        "snippet": "L176: $request = wp_remote_post($this->update_path, $params );  \u2192  L180: return @unserialize( $request['body'] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Wise Chat (4k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwise-chat
Patterndirect_mysqli_connect
Kindbuiltin
Version3.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
src/Endpoints/Ultra/index.php
Line
70
Snippet
$dbWC = new mysqli($constants['DB_HOST'], $constants['DB_USER'], $constants['DB_PASSWORD'], $constants['DB_NAME']);
Explanationplugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` — a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wise-chat",
    "pattern": "direct_mysqli_connect",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "3.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "src/Endpoints/Ultra/index.php",
        "line": 70,
        "snippet": "$dbWC = new mysqli($constants['DB_HOST'], $constants['DB_USER'], $constants['DB_PASSWORD'], $constants['DB_NAME']);"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin instantiates `new mysqli($var['host'], ...)` \u2014 a direct MySQL connection bypassing `$wpdb`. Legitimate WordPress plugins always go through `$wpdb` (which already has the connection); a raw `mysqli` connect using parsed wp-config credentials is the credential-harvesting backdoor shape."
}
Critical code_pattern Envato Toolkit (5k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugtoolkit-for-envato
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version1.4
Hit count12
First hit
File
Models/class.EnvatoAPIManager.php
Line
393
Snippet
* @param string $paramPluginAuthor
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "toolkit-for-envato",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "1.4",
    "hit_count": 12,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "Models/class.EnvatoAPIManager.php",
        "line": 393,
        "snippet": "* @param string $paramPluginAuthor"
    },
    "explanation": null
}
Critical code_pattern SoftTech-IT bKash, Rocket, Nagad (5k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugbkash
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version2.4
Hit count1
First hit
File
index.php
Line
82
Snippet
( http://66.45.237.70/api.php )</p>
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "bkash",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "2.4",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "index.php",
        "line": 82,
        "snippet": "( http://66.45.237.70/api.php )</p>"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Awesome Support – WordPress HelpDesk & Support Plugin (6k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugawesome-support
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version6.3.8
Hit count1
First hit
File
includes/gas-framework/inc/scssphp/scss.inc.php
Line
3,675
Snippet
L3670: $response = wp_remote_get($icache); → L3675: $imports = @unserialize( $body, ['allowed_classes' => false] );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "awesome-support",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "6.3.8",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/gas-framework/inc/scssphp/scss.inc.php",
        "line": 3675,
        "snippet": "L3670: $response = wp_remote_get($icache);  \u2192  L3675: $imports = @unserialize( $body, ['allowed_classes' => false] );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern Security Ninja – WordPress Security & Firewall (7k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugsecurity-ninja
Patternserialized_admin_role
Kindbuiltin
Version5.281
Hit count2
First hit
File
modules/events-logger/events-logger.php
Line
206
Snippet
'%s:13:"administrator"%',
Explanationplugin source contains `s:13:"administrator"` — the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "security-ninja",
    "pattern": "serialized_admin_role",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "5.281",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "modules/events-logger/events-logger.php",
        "line": 206,
        "snippet": "'%s:13:\"administrator\"%',"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source contains `s:13:\"administrator\"` \u2014 the PHP-serialized representation of the `administrator` role meta value. Used to bypass `wp_insert_user()` by writing directly to `wp_usermeta` with a hand-crafted capabilities string. Near-zero FP because legit code uses `WP_User::set_role()` instead of building the serialized form by hand."
}
Critical code_pattern WSMS (formerly WP SMS): SMS Notifications, OTP Login and WooCommerce SMS (7k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugwp-sms
Patternhardcoded_ip_url
Kindbuiltin
Version7.2.4
Hit count7
First hit
File
includes/gateways/class-wpsms-gateway-onlinepanel.php
Line
9
Snippet
private $wsdl_link = "http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?WSDL";
Explanationplugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) — legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "wp-sms",
    "pattern": "hardcoded_ip_url",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "7.2.4",
    "hit_count": 7,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/gateways/class-wpsms-gateway-onlinepanel.php",
        "line": 9,
        "snippet": "private $wsdl_link = \"http://87.107.121.52/post/send.asmx?WSDL\";"
    },
    "explanation": "plugin source hardcodes a raw IPv4 URL (e.g. `https://94.156.79.8/...`) \u2014 legitimate plugins use DNS hostnames because IPs change. Hardcoded IPs in plugin code are almost always either dev leftovers or attacker C2 infrastructure. The June 2024 social-warfare keylogger (audit #14) used `https://94.156.79.8/sc-top.js` for the JS payload host, `/AddSites` for victim registration, `/CMSUsers` for filesystem-recon exfil. Operator infrastructure on raw IPs avoids domain registration / RDAP detection paths. Post-filtered to skip RFC1918/loopback/link-local ranges and `vendor/`/`tests/` paths."
}
Critical code_pattern Jetpack VaultPress (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugvaultpress
Patternunserialize_after_remote_call
Kindbuiltin
Version4.0.7
Hit count1
First hit
File
vaultpress.php
Line
1,516
Snippet
L1512: $r = wp_remote_get( $url=sprintf( "%s://%s/%s?cidr_ranges=1", $protocol, $hostname, $pa → L1516: $data = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $r ) );
Explanationa remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file — classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised.
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "vaultpress",
    "pattern": "unserialize_after_remote_call",
    "kind": "builtin",
    "version": "4.0.7",
    "hit_count": 1,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "vaultpress.php",
        "line": 1516,
        "snippet": "L1512: $r = wp_remote_get( $url=sprintf( \"%s://%s/%s?cidr_ranges=1\", $protocol, $hostname, $pa  \u2192  L1516: $data = @unserialize( wp_remote_retrieve_body( $r ) );"
    },
    "explanation": "a remote HTTP fetch (`wp_remote_*` / `curl_exec`) is followed by `@unserialize` within the same file \u2014 classic PHP Object Injection C2 gadget. The error-suppressed form is the tell: legit code wants to know when deserialize fails; attackers suppress so malformed gadgets do not leak. A real finding regardless of author intent: any plugin that deserializes remote responses without validation is a latent RCE chain if the remote endpoint is ever compromised."
}
Critical code_pattern YaySMTP – WP Mail SMTP with Email Logs, Tracking & Reports (10k+ installs) Resolved 6mo ago
Slugyaysmtp
PatternPluginAUTH
Kindioc:code_pattern
Version2.7.4
Hit count2
First hit
File
includes/Controller/ZohoServiceVendController.php
Line
41
Snippet
public static function getPluginAuthUrl() {
Explanation—
View raw JSON
{
    "slug": "yaysmtp",
    "pattern": "PluginAUTH",
    "kind": "ioc:code_pattern",
    "version": "2.7.4",
    "hit_count": 2,
    "first_hit": {
        "file": "includes/Controller/ZohoServiceVendController.php",
        "line": 41,
        "snippet": "public static function getPluginAuthUrl() {"
    },
    "explanation": null
}